

Dr. Mustafa Cerić važi za jednog od najuticajnijih muslimanskih ličnosti današnjice. Završio je Gazi Husrev-begovu medresu u Sarajevu, a diplomirao na Univerzitetu Al-Azhar u Kairu, Egipat. Doktorirao je na Čikaškom univerzitetu pred uglednim muslimanskim učenjakom Fazlur Rahmanom. Predavao je na Međunarodnom institutu islamske misli i civilizacije u Kuala Lumpuru u Maleziji pod vođstvom prof. Naquib Al-Attasa, te kao gostujući profesor na Svjetskom univerzitetu za islamske nauke i obrazovanje, Amman, Jordan. Vodio je Islamsku zajednicu u Bosni i Hercegovini kao reisu-lulema i vrhovni muftija(1993 - 2012) u ratu i miru; njegovo vodstvo je imalo veliki utjecaj na domaća i međunarodna pitanja koja se tiču istine, pravde, mira i pomirenja. Dr. Cerić je zagovornik međukulturalnog angažmana, kao i mirovni aktivist; dobitnik je UNESCO-ove nagrade za mir, nagrade Theodor-Heuss-Stiftug, Sternbergove nagrade, nagrade zaklade Eugen Biser, nagrade za životno djelo asocijacije UK Muslim Social Scientist, nagrade Fondacije Ducci... Napisao je Deklaraciju evropskih muslimana; predvodio muslimansku delegaciju inicijative Zajednička riječ u Vatikanu; član je Odbora savjesti koji se bori protiv poricanja holokausta; član je Upravnog odbora Muslimanskog mirovnog foruma, Abu Dabi; specijalni savjetnik šejha Abdallaha bin Bejje; počasni predsjednik Svjetske konferencije 'Religija za mir'; uvršten je među 50 najuticajnijih muslimana u svijetu... Redovni je član Kraljevske akademije Al al-Bajt (Jordan), a jedan je od osnivača i redovni član BANU-a (Bosna). E-Mail: cericmustafa@gmail.com

Dr. Mustafa Cerić is considered one of the most induential Muslim figures of today. He completed the Gazi Husrevbeg Madrasa in Sarajevo and earned a scholarship to Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. He received his doctorate from the University of Chicago by the mentorship of the eminent Muslim scholar Fazlur Rahman. He lectured at the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, under the leadership of Prof. Naquib Al-Attas; was a Visiting Professor at the World University of Islamic Sciences and Education, Amman, Jordan. He led the Islamic Community as the Grand Mufti (Raisu-l-ulama) of Bosnia (1993-2012) in war and peace; his leadership had a major impact on domestic and international issues concerning truth, justice, peace and reconciliation. Dr. Cerić is an advocate of intercultural engagement as well as a peace activist; he won the UNESCO Peace Prize, the Theodor-Heuss-Stiftung Prize, the Sternberg Prize, the Eugen Biser Foundation Prize, the UK Muslim Social Scientist Association Life Achievement Prize, Ducci Foundation Prize... He wrote Declaration of European Muslims; led the Muslim delegation of the Common Word initiative to the Vatican; he is a member of the Committee of Conscience against Holocaust denial; he is a member of the Board of Trustees of Muslim Peace Forum, Abu Dhabi; he is a special adviser to Sheikh Abdallah bin Bayyah; he is Honorary President of World Conference Religions for Peace; he is listed among the 50 most influential Muslims in the world ... He is a ful member of the Royal Academy Al al-Bayt (Jordan), and is one of the founders and ful member of BANU (Bosnia). E-Mail: cericmustafa@gmail.com



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Mustafa CERIĆ

## O FENOMENU POPULIZAMA I EKSTREMIZMA NA BALKANU

ON THE PHENOMENON OF POPULISM AND EXTREMISM IN THE BALKANS

## Abstract

This paper is based on my personal experience of war and peace in Bosnia. The basic notion is that it is easier to start a war than to stop it. Thus, the postwar recovery or peace-building is not easy. But thanks to open-minded people who have been all along against a mythical populism that caused the bloody war against Bosnia and its autochthon people, the peace, although unjust, was reached after all. The focus here is on the idea of pluralism in Bosnia as an opposite to "populism" and "extremism". For a positive narrative like pluralism is a good way to encounter the today's threat of "populism" and "extremism". A positive or optimistic narrative is creative while a negative and pessimistic one is depressive and discouraging.

**Key words**: the Balkans, populism, extremism, pluralism, balkanization, Bosnia, Europe, orientalism, millet, Epochal War, political lie, human rights.

## ON THE PHENOMENON OF POPULISM AND EXTREMISM IN THE BALKANS

I

re the phenomena of populism and extremism new? No, they are not new, but they are nowadays more conspicuous and dangerous than before because of the phenomenon of New Media, i.e., the social media. But the problem is not in the media as such. The media – social or otherwise – is used as the means to highlight the end. Thus, the problem is in the human mind that defines a political end, or otherwise, that is presumably achievable by the way of populism that leads to extremism. Indeed, we are faced today with a shift of human mind-set not only in political thought but also in moral perception. It is obvious that today's politics is becoming more and more without principles.\*1

We know by now that the First World War had ended feudalism together with the universal (imperial) state,\*2 while the Second Epochal War had relatively defeated fascism together with racism. In the aftermath of that new development, the world had been made up of nation states that had agreed to regulate their relationships by the international law and order under the auspice of the United Nations. In principle, as the members of the United Nations, all nation states had accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\*3 On 10 December 1948, the United General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."\*4

However, the struggle had continued between liberal democracy of the West and the authoritarian socialism of the Soviet Union. This struggle only calmed following the Soviet collapse in 1990 and the obvious triumph of Western liberal democracy. It was thought that the world has headed toward an era of more stable global peace and security. But this was not so. The vacuum of following the Cold War created more challenges than anyone could have imagined.\*5 It created an open space for an ethnic and national populism and extremism in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Compare seven deadly sins: 1) Wealth Without Work; 2) Pleasure Without Conscience; 3) Knowledge Without Character; 4) Commerce (Business) Without Morality (Ethics); 5) Science Without Humanity; 6) Religion Without Sacrifice; 7) Politics Without Principle.

See, Stephen R. Covey, *Principle Centered Leadership*, Free Press, New York, 1991, pp. 87-93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The universal states at the time were Ottoman and Habsburg empires. Both had a religious matrix for their political rule and a system of feudalism for their economic system. The world had been basically divided between Islamdom and Christendom.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Declaration was celebrated in 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Declaration is an international document adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations that contains the rights and freedoms of all human beings. The General Assembly accepted it as Resolution 217 at its third session on 10/10/1948 at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, France. Of the 58 members of the United Nations at the time, 48 voted in favor, none against, eight abstained, and two did not vote. See, *Opća deklaracija o ljudskim pravima*, (1948). Available at: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declarationhuman-rights/. Accessed on 29.10.2022.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 eliminated the Cold War imperatives that had sustained America's fragile class compromise and narrowed the ideological space for political dissent. The triumph of the neoliberal order was ensured not by the Republican Party that nurtured its rise, but by the tacit acquiescence of Democratic President Bill Clinton to the political regime they established.

the post-communist countries that led post-Yugoslav republics in the Balkans, especially Bosnia, into a bloody war that ended in the Serbian Genocide in Srebrenica against the Muslims of Bosnia.\*6



ILLUSTRATION ~ Document about the genocide committed in Srebrenica. Excavation of the remains of human bodies found in the primary grave.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dokument o izvršenom genocidu u Srebrenici. Iskopavanje pronađenih ostataka ljudskih tijela u primarnoj grobnici.

Clinton became an Eisenhower Democrat under the influence of political strategist Dick Morris and senior cabinet members.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See, *Srebrenica massacre: Bosnian history* [1995], Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Srebrenica-massacre/Aftermath. Accessed on 10/29/2022. See also, "Srebrenica Timeline of a Genocide" in International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, available at: https://www.irmct.org/specials/srebrenica/timeline/en/. Accessed on 10/29/2022.





ere is how I see the Balkans from a bird's eye view. Marija Todorova, a Bulgarian historian, helps me with this. Namely, her valuable work on the Balkans\*<sup>7</sup> is a kind of *Apology* of the Balkans before the European jury, which is similar to Plato's *Apology* of Socrates before the Athenian jury. The outcome is also similar. Socrates was accused of "moral" and the Balkans of "peaceful corruption." Convicted guilty, Socrates judged himself, while the guilty Balkans are condemned to wait on the margins of European history for a verdict on their entry or non-entry into the European Union, which does not want the Balkans because of the European as well as (our) Balkan corruption.

Here is a bird's eye view of the Balkans. Marija Todorova, a Bulgarian historian, helps me with this. Her valuable work on the Balkans is a kind of *Apology* of the Balkans before the European jury, which is similar to Plato's *Apology* of Socrates before the Athenian jury. The outcome is also similar. Socrates was accused of "moral" and the Balkans of "peaceful corruption." Convicted guilty, Socrates judged himself, and the guilty Balkans is on the sidelines waiting for the European verdict for their entry or non-entry into Europe, which do not want the Balkans in its circle because of its and the Balkans' corruption.

As Maria Todorova has rightly noticed, the Balkans was marked by an *imagology*\*8 as a cultural, social, and political construct. As an image, this *imagology* has a very strong impact. When it reaches the level of the unconscious, it becomes a powerful tool for the purpose of defining the unknown other. What is unknown is always dangerous. But, the need to define it is to have a control over it and to dominate it. Although relying heavily on the Edward Said's "Orientalism", which deals with the Western structuring of the orient as "other",\*9 Maria Todorova rejects the idea of balkanism as being "a merely subspecies of orientalism".\*10

However, Todorova does not fail to remind us of the mystique of the Balkans, which is different from the oriental but still mystical in its own right. She brought in her narrative a lively description of the Balkan spirit by an American, Arthur Smith, who visited the area in 1907 and wrote this:

To those who have not visited them, the Balkans are a shadow-land of mystery; to those who know them, they become even more mysterious... You become, in a sense, a part of the spell, and of the mystery and glamour of the whole. You contract the habit of crouching over your morning coffee in the café, when you meet a man of your acquaintance, at least half of what

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Todorova, Maria: *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford University Press, 1997.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Edward W Said. *Orientalism*. New York, Pantheon, 1978.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Todorova, Maria: *Imagining the Balkans* .., p. 8.

you say is whispered, portentously. Intrigue, plotting, mystery, high courage, and daring deeds - the things that are the soul of true romance are to-day the soul of the Balkans.\*<sup>11</sup>

Perhaps, the Balkans, in the meantime, haven't change much except that they are not anymore "unimaginable concreteness", to use Todorava's phrase, and they are not anymore as mystical as they used to be. They are as concrete and as real as anyone else but still somewhat as strange and as foreign to the European mindset as ever before. When the Balkans insist to be identified as Europeans in a political and economic sense, Europe is hesitant to accept them, but when they turn their backs to Europe, Europe is crying to have them back. Thus, torn between the "othering" and "gathering" in their relation to the European Union, the Balkans are just an *imagology* or a *diagnosis* rather than a part and parcel of European geography. However, despite the fact that the history of the Balkans is inseparable from the overall history of Europe, the historical experience of the Balkans in terms of their ethnical, national, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity is very distinguishable.\*\*12

Thus, the description of the Balkans as the "other" than Europe is a correct one but not in the sense of a European pejorative prejudice, but rather in the sense of their perseverance in maintaining an ethnical, cultural and religious diversity throughout centuries. Against all odds, the Balkans are still one of the densest areas of ethnical, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity. I have no intention to advocate for the *millet* system practiced by the Ottoman Empire, which recognized the right of the "personal law" of the confessional communities such as the Muslim *Sharīʿah* Law, Christian *Canon* Law and the Jewish *Halakhah* Law as independent bodies of law within the overall legal system of the Ottoman state.

However, I want to indicate to the fact that this *millet* system had been a vehicle for a preservation of specific religious as well as cultural identities of such communities.<sup>13</sup> This is, perhaps, the main reason that the Balkans, unlike Europe, had no inquisition such as the Spanish inquisition, for instance.

Also, as my own apology of the Balkans before the European jury, I would like to say that if the term "balkanization", which was coined in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, has a negative meaning because of the numerous new states that arose from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in the Balkans, by the same token, the term "nationalization of Europe" might have the same negative connotation because of the numerous new states that arose in Europe from the collapse of the universal state represented in the idea of Christendom, which had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Diana Mishkova's extensive study concentrates on the ways various generations of scholars defined the Balkans, in order to inspect political usage of academic projects. By focusing on intra-regional geopolitical stakes and cross-border interactions, Mishkova changes the usual perception of the Balkans as a postcolonial space. With a fresh approach to the complicated notion of balkanism and a more than respectable corpus of critical literature, this research builds a basis for the further development of Area Studies in general.

See the historical textbook, Diana Mishkova: Beyond Balkanism: The Scholarly Politics of Region Making, Routledge, New York, 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> According to Catherine Verdera, contrary to the Orient which serves as the polar opposite of Europe, the Balkans is the "Other from within" Europe in the interstitial position of being neither here nor there.

Compare: Katherine Verdery : *Review* : [Untitled] Reviewed Work : Imagining the Balkans by Maria Todorova. Slavic Review, 58 (2), Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 472–473.

turned to become many secular "nation states" but still with a recognizable Christian cultural nature. I would like to join Maria Todorova in her apology of the Balkans against the charge of the Balkan "ancient hatred" as being an exclusively bad feature of the Balkans as such while she quotes the American journalist Roger Cohen, who explains that "the notion of killing people . . . because of something that may have happened in 1495 is unthinkable in the Western world. Not in the Balkans". In response to this charge, Todorova has pointed out that "He (Roger Cohen) is quite right. In the Balkans they were killing over something that happened over 500 years ago; in Europe, with a longer span of civilized memory, they were killing over something that happened 2,000 years ago. One is tempted to ask whether the Holocaust resulted from a "due" or "undue" predominance of barbarity".\*<sup>14</sup>



ILLUSTRATION ~ In Europe, with a longer span of civilized memory, they killed over something that happened 2000 years ago. We are tempted to ask ourselves whether the Holocaust was the result of the 'due' or 'unjustified' dominance of barbarism, Todorova wonders. (Auschwitz concentration camp)
ILUSTRACIJA ~ U Evropi, sa dužim rasponom civilizovanog pamćenja, ubijali su nad nečim što se dogodilo prije 2000 godina. U iskušenju je da se zapitamo da li je holokaust rezultat 'dužne' ili 'neopravdane' prevlasti barbarstva, pita se Todorova. (Koncentracioni logor Auschwitz)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Todorova, Maria: *Imagining the...*, p. 6.

I don't want you to get the impression that the Balkans are better than the Europeans, but they are not worse than them either. In a compression of bad behavior in history the Balkans and the Europeans are almost equal, but in a comparison of a great historical advancement after a painful historical experience, the Europeans are far better than the Balkans because they have understood, unlike the Balkans, that, after all, "Historia est magistra vitae". If anything, the Balkans, like Europe, is full of history - bad as well as good. It depends on the state of human mind which of these two are man's choice - bad or good historical example for a new action in a new history.

There is another characteristic that makes the Balkans interesting. Namely, the Balkans are good kingmakers rather than good kings themselves for themselves. Indeed, all imperial powers that ruled the Balkans were imperial only as long as they had the Balkans under their political and economic control. This had happened to the Roman, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian as well as recently to the imperial power of the Communist International (Comintern) represented in the power of the Soviet Union, which dominated Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary and to some extent ex-Yugoslavia as well. Once, the imperial power loses its power over the Balkans, it loses its imperial title, it loses its prestige on the global stage. This is why the rivalry over the Balkans, which some like to call Eastern Europe as well, between the great world powers have been always a big contested issue; this is why the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria happened in Sarajevo in 1914 that ignited the First Epochal War in history and not elsewhere.\*15

However, I believe that we are talking here not about the clash of civilizations but rather about the clash of human minds. If anywhere, it's in the Balkans that we have more than one world civilization. These different world civilizations have coexisted in the Balkans for centuries. Namely, the Orthodox Eastern European, the Western European, and the Islamic civilization, "of which the Orthodox European is primary",\*16 are still live civilizations in the Balkans. Before the advent of the Islamic civilization into the Balkans in the twelfth century, the Roman Emperor Diocletian (284-305) had divided the Roman Empire into two administrative halves. The invisible line of that division ran through the territory of Bosnia.\*17

Thus, marked by this invisible line between two administrative realms of the Roman Empire, Bosnia has been destined to remain a kind of buffer zone between two competing Christian dogmas: the dogma of the Orthodox

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> About the rivalry in the Balkans see, Wolfers, Arnold: *The Balkans and the Great Powers*. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 177, Radio: The Fifth Estate, pp. 232-236. Sage Publications, Inc., Jan., 1935. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1019987. Accessed on 10/29/2022.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Todorova, Maria: *Imagining the...*, p.p. 12-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The Tetrarchy ("rule of four") was created by Diocletian in 293 CE. In the third century, the Roman Empire had grown too large and impossible to administer. To solve this problem, Diocletian divided the Roman Empire into four distinct territories, each to be governed by a different ruler. This brought to an end the Crisis of the Third Century and stabilized the Roman Empire. The Tetrarchy did not last long, and within twenty years was dismantled, in favor of a permanent division between an Eastern Roman Empire (led by Constantine) and a Western Roman Empire (led by Licinius).

To see wider, Gill, N.S.: What Was the Roman Tetrarchy? Thought Co, Aug. 28, 2020. Available at: thought co.com/definition-of-tetrarchy-120830. Accessed on 10/29/2022. See also, Phelan, Joe: Why did the Roman Empire split in two? Live Science Newsletter, September 25, 2022. Available at: https://www.livescience.com/why-roman-empire-split-in-two. Accessed on 10/29/2022.

Church of Byzantine and the dogma of the Catholic Church of Rome. This state of affairs is still present in Bosnia. However, Bosnia had belonged to neither of the two. We shall elaborate these points later in the paper.




ILLUSTRATION ~ The conflict between Tito and Stalin created the first Communist Protestant - Resolution of Informbiro 1948.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Sukob između Tita i Staljina je stvorio prvog komunističkog protestanta - Rezolucija Informbiroa 1948.




ILLUSTRATION ~ Experience has not yet taught men sufficiently to act according to the teachings of pure reason. Instead, people as a crowd act out of their unconscious power, which is stronger than their pure individual reason and their personal morality.

Are we in a state of barbarism today because of populism, extremism and the monopoly on lies?

n the introduction to his book *The Virtues of Mendacity*,\*18 which deals with lying in politics, Martin Jay has brought to our attention a piece of Adolf Hitler's ill-famed thought expressed in his *Mein Kampf*, which reads:

The magnitude of a lie always contains a certain factor of credibility, since the great masses of the people in the very bottom of their hearts tend to be corrupted rather than consciously and purposely evil, and that, therefore, in view of the primitive simplicity of their minds, they more easily fall victim to the big lie than to a little one, since they themselves lie in little things, but would be ashamed of lies that were too big. Such a falsehood will never enter their heads, and they will not be able to believe in the possibility of such monstrous effrontery and infamous misrepresentation in others...

Therefore, something of even the most insolent lie will always remain and stick - a fact which all the great lie-virtuosi and lying-clubs in this world know only too well and also make the most treacherous use of.\*19

Most probably, I wouldn't comprehend this Hitler's quotation if I didn't experience it fully in my life in Bosnia. It was prior and during the war against Bosnia with a long siege of the capital city of Sarajevo that has lasted for almost four years - indeed, it has lasted for 1,425 days which is longer than the Battle of Stalingrad and more than a year longer than the siege of Leningrad - that I have tasted the bitterness of a big lie that has been unashamedly expressed through the mind of a notorious Serbian nationalist, better known as the father of the Serbian nation, Dobrica Čosić, who is quoted to have said:

We (the Serbs) lie to deceive ourselves, to console others, we lie for mercy, we lie to fight fear, to encourage ourselves, to hide our and somebody else's misery. We lie for love and honesty. We lie because of freedom. Lying is a trait of our patriotism and the proof of our innate intelligence. We lie creatively, imaginatively and inventively.\*20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Martin, Jay: *The Vertues Mendocity - On Lying in Politics*. University of Virginia Press, 2010, p. 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Hitler, Adolf: *Mein Kampf: Adolf Hitler* - (Ralph Manheim Translation). A Mariner Book, Houghton Mifflin Company Boston and New York, 1999, p. 231.

Available at: https://archive.org/details/mein-kampf-by-adolf-hitler-ralph-manheim-translation/page/iv/mode/2up. Accessed on 10/29/2022.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Ćosić, Dobrica: A quote from a trilogy of novels *Divisions/Deobe*. Laguna, Beograd, 2017, pp. 96-97.

But to be fair, the idea of a noble lie has not been a recent invention. It is a concept originated by Plato in his *Republic*. It has been somehow justified in politics as a myth or untruth almost as of religious nature purposely propagated by an elite to maintain social peace and harmony, but also to advance a political or otherwise agenda. Thus, the root of a political populism that leads to a religious or ideological extremism lies in a notion of a big lie as a noble lie. Based on it, Hannah Arendt has noticed that:

No one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other, and no one, as far as I know, has ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues. Lies have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable tools not only of the politician's or the demagogue's but also of the statesman's trade.\*21

Pierre Lenan has backed up the Arendt's idea by saying:

At the center of the political game is the lie: that is deliberate, organized, regulated, calculated, necessary deception: reasoning about politics while excluding the lie leads to an abusive naïve vision, to an error of evaluation. To believe that there can be a politics without lying would seem illusory: political life, the way it is practiced, supposes an elevated rate, a tight web of lies of different forms and degrees.\*\*



ILLUSTRATION ~ Dobrica Ćosić, a notorious Serbian nationalist, better known as the "father of the Serbian nation". ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dobrica Ćosić, ozloglašeni srpski nacionalista, poznatiji kao "otac srpskog naroda".

But do the politicians have the monopoly on lying? No, they do not have such a monopoly. They have only the political power, which enables them to lie "creatively, imaginatively and inventively", as Dobrica Čosić said. Today, everyone has the "right" to lie and everyone has the right to make his/her own "fake news". Indeed, today, everyone is a self-editor of self-newspaper, self-image, self-promotion, self-censorship, self-recognition and self-realization on *Facebook, Tweeter, Instagram*, etc. Thus, no one has the monopoly on the truth either. But everyone has the right to his/her own truth as well as his/her own lie. So, the monopoly on the lie, which was a politicians' privilege,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Arendt, Hannah: *Truth and Politics.* In: *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, ed. Peter Baehr, New York, 2000, p. 545.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Lenan, Pierre: Le mensonge politique. Paris, 1988. See also, Jay, Martin: Introduction, note 73, p. 188, in The Virtues of Mendacity.

as Hannah Arendt and Pierre Lenan have pointed out, is not any more an exclusive right and warrant of politics. Today the lying is a common feature in other fields as well: in sports, in banks, in schools, in medicine, in trades, in parliaments as well as in churches, mosques and synagogues, etc. It used to be a rule that the politicians don't know how to tell the truth, the priests don't know how to tell the lie, and the journalists don't know how to make the difference between the two. Nowadays, this old rule has been broken. After all, some politicians do know how to tell the truth, but people still don't believe them, although they still vote for them again and again despite the fact that they have previously lied to them. Unfortunately, some priests have broken their oath of covenant with God and their contract with men not to lie. They have been caught not only lying but also hiding their lies. Thus, some of them lost the public trust. Of course, we should give a credit to some bold journalists who know how to make a difference between the truth and lie. But, the most notorious of lies happened in banks. The Bernie Madoff's lie in banking was as big as Hitler's lie. Yes, this is exactly what I want to say: we are, as humanity, in a big crisis of public trust not only in politics, but also in almost all fields of life. People nowadays have difficulty to reason with each other and thus they run away from each other. In such a state of human mind, the only thing that attracts people's attention as sensible to their mind is satire and cynicism. It seems that this was what Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus had in mind in 1505 when he wrote his " In Praise of Folly."\*23 Close to his satiric mind was the great Muslim mind of Abū Hayyān Al-Tawhīdī\*24 (d. 1023) who had burnt his books before he died because he thought that people had been so much indulged in their follies that no one will read his books after his death. He thought that the people at his time had lost their ability to reason with each other.

It was the French polymath Gustave Le Bon (1841- 1931) who studied the mind of crowd and came to the conclusion that "a crowd is as easily heroic as criminal".\*25 I would add to it that to start a war is as easily as having a piece of cake, but to stop it and to start peace is as hard as climbing to the Himalayas. If you ask why is so, I would say, as Gustave Le Bon has noticed, that experience has not taught men as yet to a sufficient degree to conduct himself upon the teaching of pure reason. Instead, men as a crowd behave out of their unconscious power, which is stronger than their pure individual reason and their personal virtuous morality.

History, says Gustave Le Bon, tells us that the moment when the moral forces on which a civilization rested have lost their strength, its final dissolution is brought about by those unconscious and brutal crowds known, justifiably enough, as barbarians.\*26

Are we today in such a state of barbarism because of populism, extremism and the New Media?


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Erasmus, Desiderius: *In Praise of Folly* (Translated by John Wilson 1668). Produced by Robert Shimmin and PG Distributed Proofreaders. HTML version by Al Haines.

Available at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9371/9371-h/9371-h.htm. Accessed 12.10.2021.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See, Yaqūt Al-Hamawī, *Muʻjam al-'udabā'*. Val. 15, p. 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Le Bon, Gustave: *The Crowd : A stusdy of the Popular Mind*. Dover Publications, New York, 2002, pp. 1-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 10. Available at: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/lebon/Crowds.pdf. Accessed on 10/29/2022.



n believe that the idea of pluralism is an answer to "populism" and "extremism". Thus, I would like to focus now on the experience of Bosnian pluralism as a force against "populism" and "extremism" with a "Bosnian experience of faith" within a European context as well. But, first let me say why I think that there is "a Bosnian experience of faith" rather than "a Bosnian Islam" before I say what the idea of "plural Bosnia" means today. First, it seems that Bosnia is an ordinary land with an ordinary old nation known from ancient times by the name of "Good Bosnians" ("Dobri Bošnjani") or "Dear-to-God" ("Bogumils").\*27

Whether this was self-naming or not, it does not matter now. What matters now is the fact that the "Good Bosnians" or the "Dear-to-God" Bosnians have had historically a moral and God-loving designation: they have been designated as "Good People" (Bono Homini) and they have been allotted as "close to God". These two attributes of being "good" and "God-loving" have determined the nature of the land of Bosnia and the nature of the people of Bosnia for goodness. After all, both the land and the people of Bosnia appeared not to be ordinary. Outsiders, whether those of nearby or those from faraway, began to look at the land and people of Bosnia as a sort of mystique because they, while being at the crossroads between Rome and Constantinople, have adopted a strange and mysterious idea of Mani, a faraway Persian man born in 216 whose parents, according to the Cologne Mani-Codex were members of the Jewish Christian Gnostic sect known as the Elcesaites.\*28

The core of Mani's teaching, known as Manichaeism, was an elaborate dualistic cosmology describing the struggle between a good spiritual world of light, and an evil, material world of darkness. Certainly, the "Good Bosnians" have opted for a good spiritual world of light against an evil material world of darkness and, thus, most likely that was the reason why they have been designated as a good people of Bosnia. Neither Rome nor Constantinople could stand idly by and allow spreading Manichaeism in the heart of Christendom, in the land of Bosnia, which is at the crossroads of east and west of the two Christian wings. So, it was then, so it is now. Bosnia has been caught by these two competing Christian confessions over its neck, each one claiming that the land and people of Bosnia belong to its own doctrine or to its own church. However, the Bosnian Church stood on its own feet, with its own religious doctrine and with its own religious institution on the top of which was *Did* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Klaić, Nada: **Srednjovjekovna Bosna**. Enimex, Zagreb, 1994, p. 197.; Klaić, Vjekoslav: **Povijest Bosne do propasti kraljevstva**, Tiskom Dioničke tiskare, Zagreb, 1882, pp. 42-43.; Filipović, Muhamed: **Bosna i Hercegovina**: **najvažnije geografske, demografske, historijske, kulturne i političke činjenice**. Compact-E, Edicija "Science", Sarajevo, 1997, p. 22.; Ćirković, Sima: **Istorija srednjovjekovne bosanske države**. Srpska književna zadruga, Beograd, 1964, p. 350.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Koenen, Ludwig: *Das Datum der Offenbarung und Geburt Manis*. Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik (ZPE), Band 8, Publisher Dr. Rudolf Habelt GmbH, 1971, pp. 247-50.

("grandfather"), who presided over a council of twelve men called *stroynici*. Some of the adherents to the Bosnian Church resided in small monasteries, known as *hiža* ("house"), while others were wanderers, known as *gosti* ("guests"). It is interesting to note that Bosnian *Kristians*, as they were also called, were aware of the First Council of Nicaea. Also, they knew that the council decided against the Arians and that Arius and two of his followers were banished to Illyria. The Bosnian *Kristians*, the Good Bosnians and the Dear-to-God Bosnians, did lean towards Arianism rather than to *Homo/ousion* ("one in being") of Athanasius of Alexandria's creed. In general, the idea of trinity was not close to the hearts of Bosnian *Kristians*.\*29




ILLUSTRATION ~ The Bosnian Church was independent, with its own religious doctrine and its own religious institution headed by Did.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Crkva bosanska je bila samostalna, sa svojom vjerskom doktrinom i svojom vjerskom institucijom na čijem vrhu je bio Did.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Vjekoslav Klaić states that between 1190 and 1199 Ban Kulin left the Christian doctrine and accepted the religion of the "Bosnian Christians". Klaić, Vjekoslav: *Povijest Bosne...*, p. 59. On the other hand, there are historical documents about the connection and communication of the Patarens and Cathars with the "Bosnian Christians". On the hierarchy of "Bosnian Christians", see: Domagoj Kaučić, *Bosnian Christians - religious principles and influence in medieval Bosnia*. Essehist, magazine of students of history and other social and humanistic sciences 10, Faculty of Philosophy in Osijek, 2019, pp. 25-30.

Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id clanak jezik=342424. Accessed on 25.05.2021.

Therefore, they were considered suspicious both by the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Church for their heretical inclination. Hence, they had to go through a thorough scrutiny called "abjuration", which was done by a legate of the Pope named Ivan de Casamaris at Bilino Polje ("Bila Valley") nearby Zenica in 1203 or they had to suffer an outright cursing, which was done by the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church at the Žiča Monastery in 1221. The words of the cursing went like this:

It should be announced to all: Rastudije Bosnian, Radomir, Dražilo, Tolko and Tvrdoš and all those who called themselves Christians, male and female, but do not kneel in front of the holy icons and the Holy Cross that they ought to be cursed... Evil heretic, triple-cursed Babuns, who falsely call themselves Christians, who mock our true religion, who miss from the holly books words and twist them to look like evil, who distance themselves from the Holy Orthodox Church, who mock the holly and honorable cross, and who mock holly icons and do not kneel in front of them - they should be cursed.\*30

In addition to all of that, we should acknowledge that, because of their alleged heresy, the land and people of Bosnia were exposed to vicious crusades, some of which may be compared in casualties (as some reports have indicated) to the atrocities of the Roman army in Carthage, known as the Punic Wars.\*<sup>31</sup>

Now, one wonders whether this harassment, these denunciations, and these heavy curses had a bad impact on the psychology of the good and God-laving Bosnians? Did they feel bad about their morality? Did they feel that they are not God-loving people anymore? Sure, some of them did feel that way, but majority were still in a good mood about their moral image and their status with God. Indeed, the timing of the arrival of Islam in 1463 was perfect. Nay, this arrival of Islam in Bosnia meant the removal of the guilt of curse that was heavily inflicted upon the good and God-loving Bosnians. Yes, it was Mehmed Fatih the Conqueror who brought to Bosnia freedom from this haunting ghost of heresy and promised instead to the good and God-loving people God's everlasting blessings so that they can feel as ever better and God-loving people of the God-loving land of Bosnia.\*32

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> "To maintain his standing as the religious and social leader, Sava continued to travel among the monasteries and lands. In 1221 a synod was held in the Zica monastery, condemning Bogomilism".

The cited quote is found in: Klaić, Nada: *Pregled izvora i historiografije za hrvatsku povijest do XII. stoljeća*. Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 1967, pp. 315-316.; Solovjev, Aleksandar: *Svedočanstva pravoslavnih izvora o bogumilstvu na Balkanu*. Nacionalna i univerzitetska biblioteka Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, 1997, pp. 54-57.; Solovjev, Aleksandar: *Vjersko učenje bosanske crkve*. Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti. Zagreb, 1948, p. 31. The Synod is most fully described in Teodosije's *Life of Saint Sava*. I have consulted the Serbian translation by L. Mirković, *Žitije Svetog Save*. (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 145-6. It is paraphrased in N. Velimirovich, *Life of Saint Sava* (orig. 1951, reprinted with new *Introduction*, New York, 1989), pp. XI, 55-6, 96-7, 99-100. A shorter account is in the Life by Domentijan; Serb translation, *Život Svetog Save i Svetog Simeona* by R. Marinković and L. Mirković, (Belgrade, 1988), p. 154.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Edwell, Peter: *War Abroad : Spain, Sicily, Macedon, Africa*. In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley, 2011, pp. 320–338.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> A few examples from different centuries of the Ottoman rule will illustrate the application of the *millet* system in real life. As soon as he conquered Bosnia, in 1463, Sultan Mehmed spoke to the people telling them to return quietly to their homes, and that they could continue to practice their own religion and their trades. The conqueror announced that the "Peoples of the Book", that is the adherents of the

On the other hand, as expected, the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church would have never thought to renounce its curse of Žiča Monastery dating from 1221. Of course, the Synod could remove this curse even today, but this is out of mind as they in the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church still think that the good and God-loving people of the God-loving land of Bosnian owe them their loyalty and their apology for heresy, not the other way around. This is a hard part of the Bosnian experience of faith, but an inspiring one though as the good and God-loving people of Bosnia have found their peace and tranquility in the peace-loving faith of Islam that has taught them what they didn't know before. But they also did preserve some experience of their old faith and pass the best of it into their new faith of Islam as the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, told to his Companions: "Khayrukum fī al-jāhiliyyah, khayrukum fī al-Islām", ("The best of you in the time prior to Islam are the best of you in the time of Islam as well"). This Prophetic rule is very much applicable to the Bosnian experience of faith. First, there was a habit in Bosnia before Islam of climbing to a mountain for a prayer of a loud dua as if you become closer to God on a high mountain. This old habit of the good and God-loving people of Bosnia is still practiced as an unquestionable Islamic tradition. Second, the substance rather than form in faith and in morality was always more preferable in the eyes of good and God-loving Bosnians. Islam came to confirm that preference in Bosnians by saying that a true righteousness is not in facing towards the east or the west, but a true righteousness is in that that you sincerely believe in God, in the day of reckoning, and that you pray honestly and regularly to God and that you give a due amount of your wealth to those who need it the most, etc. It is probably this idea of real substance rather than an empty form in faith that forged a Bosnian proverb which says: "Dobar je čovjek, ali ne hvali mu zakona" ("He is a good man, but don't praise his law"). In other words, don't judge man's faith, judge his deeds, and judge his morality, which is a reflection of his real faith.



ILLUSTRACIJA ~ The arrival of Islam in Bosnia meant removing the guilt of the curse that was inflicted on good and God-loving Bosnians.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dolazak islama u Bosnu značio je otklanjanje krivice prokletstva koje je bilo teško naneseno dobrim i bogoljubivim Bosancima.

divinely revealed religions, would preserve their special status under the protection of the state. The Sultan established the rights of the Christians by an "ahdname" (pledge) granted through an imperial decree. This pledge expresses important issues such as protection of the minorities, freedom of language, education in one's own language as well as religious, cultural and economic freedom.

See, Franz Babinger: Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time. Princeton University Press, 1978.




ILLUSTRATION ~ TThe Peace of Westphalia marked the end of the *Thirty Years' War* (1618 – 1648), in which all European superpowers participated and which was not only a conflict between states, but also between religions.

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or more than a thousand years, there has been an experience of faith in Bosnia with three recognizable and characteristic periodic layers: a) a period of four or five centuries of Manichaeism prior to Islam;\*33 b) a period of five or six centuries of Islam proper;\*34 and c) a period of more than one century of Islam "lost and found."\*35 While these layers are by definition different, they, however, share two unbreakable threads: (1) a resilience, i.e. a quality of being able to return to a previous condition after problems; (2) a resistance or durability, i.e. a quality of being able to sustain the Bosnian tradition of faith against "abjuration", "cursing" and "atheization" during the communist time, and recently, "takfir", i.e. a guiltification or uglification of the Bosnian tradition of faith, which has its own aroma of Islam, especially after the experience of Genocide.

Based on what has been said so far, it may be concluded that Bosnia is destined for its plural setting. Unlike the period prior to the arrival of Islam, when Bosnia had been under a severe pressure of "faith cleansing", Mehmed Fatih the Conqueror initiated something unknown previously not only in Bosnia but also in Europe. He initiated to the oath of God, on the oath of all God's messengers and on the oath of his personal power and honor – indeed,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> A Christian heresy in the Middle Ages, called Manichaeism, saw evil and good as equal forces in contention. One group, the Albigensians in Provence, was destroyed by holy crusade in the 13th century. In Bosnia, this heresy lived on, its adherents called Bogomils. Catholic and Orthodox churches and polities were equally intent on destroying Bogomilism. Bogomils fought, understandably, to retain Bosnia's independence.

See more Dimitri Obolensky: The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Antonina Zheliazkova: *The Penetration and Adaptation of Islam in Bosnia from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century. Journal of Islamic Studies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, July 1994. 5 (2: Islam in The Balkans), pp. 187–208.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Rehabilitating a pre-war idea which was predominant among the Serbian and Croatian intelligentsia, the Communists adopted the concept of ethnic origin as the attribute for nation as well. Slav Muslims were considered just a religious group and thus, were not included in any of the above-mentioned groups, not even in the category of "other nationalities and ethnic-groups." It was inconceivable for the Communists the notion of nationhood based on another criterion/attribute than ethnicity. Just as the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) and the Muslim Religious Community (IVZ) never ventured an opinion on any political aspect of the national question or on some form of autonomy.

Shoup, Paul Shoup: Communism and the Yugoslav National Question. Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 109. Atif Purivatra recognizes that "...it was primarily through Islam that part of the population of central Bosnia accepted and developed a corresponding religious-social and spiritual structure on the basis of which, and under the influence of specific factors, a separate ethnic individuality was established as a separate socio-ethnic formation..."

Atif Purivatra: On the National Phenomenon of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina ("O Nacionalnom Fenomenu Bosansko-Hercegovačkih Muslimana", translation Hrgovic, Milica), in Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia, Međunarodna Politika, Belgrade, 1974, p. 308-311.

Popovic accused laic Muslim nationalism (movement of radical laic Muslims - in opposition to the radical religious Islamic - which emerged among Communist intelligentsia,) of being inextricably linked, in the one or the other way, to a religious component. He illustrated the idea with those high rank Muslim intellectuals who expressed a "guilty tenderness" to the "eternal values of the Islam, who looked for approaching Marxism and Islam, in line with the ideas of Kadhafi's "Green book," as did Purivatra, one of the major Muslim Marxist theorists.

Alexandre Popovic: Les Musulmans Yougoslaves, 1945-1989. Médiateurs et Métaphores, L'Âge d'Homme, Lausanne, 1990, pp. 35-38.

he signed in 1464, the first year of his arrival in Bosnia, the document of *Ahdname* based on the quintessence of *Sharī'ah* ("khamsah ḍarūriyyāt"), namely, the guarantee of the sanctity of the five fundamental values of human being: al-nafs (life), al-dīn (faith), al-'aql (freedom), al-māl (property) and al-'ird (dignity) to every individual in Bosnia regardless of his/her race, faith and ethnicity. This had been and still is one of the most powerful precedents in advancing a religious pluralism of an Islamic origin. It is not a coincidence that the document of Fatih's *Ahdname* was worked out in Bosnia. Bosnia had been in need of such a document at the time, but also it was ready to embrace it fully as well.\*<sup>36</sup> Europe has long waited for a similar document to be worked out only in the word of *Nostra Aetate*, the Document on the Relation of the Church with Non-Christian Religions of the Second Vatican Council which was promulgated in 1965.\*<sup>37</sup>




ILLUSTRATION ~ Nostra Aetate - The Declaration on the relationship of the Church towards non-Christian religions of the Second Vatican Council from October 28, 1965.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Nostra Aetate - Deklaracija o odnosu Crkve prema nekršćanskim religijama Drugog vatikanskog sabora iz 28. 10.1965.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>The edict was issued by the Sultan Mehmet II El Fatih to protect the basic rights of Bosnian people when he conquered Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1463. The original edict is still kept in Franciscan Monastery in the vicinity of Fojnica. The *Ahdnama* of Sultan Mehmet Fatih is an oldest Human Rights Declaration known in history, declared in 1463. It was announced 326 years before the French Revolution of 1789, 485 years before 1948 the International Human Rights Declaration of 1948.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Pope Paul VI: *Declaration on the relation of the church to non-christian religions* — *Nostra Aetate*. Holy. See 28 October 1965. Available at: https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist\_councils/ii\_vatican\_council/documents/vat-ii\_decl\_19651028\_nostra-aetate\_en.html. Accessed 25.12.2021.

Except for a mythical imagination, Europe has no experience of faith in terms of a heavenly touch or a blessing as the oriental east had and still has. Europe has only a copy of an immediate heavenly intervention or revelation. Thus, a dispute about whose copy is original has led Europe to a series of religious wars in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century. This was really devastating for the continent. Over 10 million people have been killed.\*38 Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) in Europe ended by the Peace of Westphalia (1648).\*39 Indeed, Europe is still under the notion of Westphalian sovereignty, based on two very essential premises: (1) sharing political and economic power in fairness; (2) appreciating religious diversity and multi-ethnicity in unity. These two axiomatic presuppositions might be summed up in the idea of Democracy and Human Rights. Indeed, these are two pillars on which today's Europe is bult up.

However, there is one more important dimension of Europe today as it tries to keep its Union alive, and that is the idea of "reconciliation". Nay, this is the key for any sense of a United Europe with its diversity of race, faith, culture, ethnicity... Until recently, it has been thought, that religion is an obstacle to "reconciliation" not only in Europe, but also in the world. Europe has been for a long time the loudest voice and the strongest force in downgrading a religious presence in the space. It has seemed that religion has lost its sway on people's minds and souls as it used to have had in the past. Indeed, it has looked as if there is no need to talk about religious or faith experience. This kind of experience does not exist anymore. What exists though is an illusion that humans can somehow live as if God does not exist and if God does exist, the humans have nothing to do with it. They are free in their humanness without God. That has been the state of mind of man, especially in Europe, the Europe in which once lived Friedrich Nietzsche, who once proclaimed that God is dead. "Gott ist tot! Gott bleibt tot! Und wir haben ihn getötet! ("God is dead. God remains dead! And we have killed him"). "However, long before Nietzsche, the phrase 'Dieu est mort!' was written in the 1854 poem 'Le Christ aux oliviers' ("Christ at the olive trees") by Gerard de Nerval" (this quotation came to us by the grace of Mr Abdullah Drury).

Indeed, Nietzsche's comment was a cry of lament and tragedy! Not a proclamation of happiness or triumph. Well, we know now that Nietzsche is dead, whereas God Almighty is ever alive and ever present on human minds and in human souls without thinking of what Nietzsche said.\*40 The problem today is that Europe doesn't know how to read religious messages that are coming once again from the east not only from the Muslims, but also from other faithful people who believe that faith is not an obstacle for a worldwide reconciliation for the sake of peace and security in the world, but, on the contrary, the genuine faith in God is the strongest force for a better, safer and peaceful world. Here the Muslims must come in to demonstrate that this is true – indeed, that the word

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Cathal Nolan: *The Age of Wars of Religion, 1000–1650*: *An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization*. Volume 2. Greenwood Publishing Group, London, 2006, pp. 708–710.; Onnekink: *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713*. Ashgate Publishing, 2013, pp. 1–8.; Ishay, Micheline: *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era*. Oakland: University of California Press, 2008, p. 99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> The Peace of Westphalia: Münster, 24 October 1648 [Excerpts]. University of Oregon.

Available at: https://pages.uoregon.edu/dluebke/301ModernEurope/Treaty%20of%20Westphalia%20%5BExcerpts%5D.pdf. Accessed 30.09.2021.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> The Gay Science, (Walter Kaufmann trans.). New York: Vintage, 1974. (1st ed. 1882, 2nd ed. 1887), pp. 108, 125, 343. Konsultirao sam The Gay Science (J. Nauckhoff trans.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001.

of "Islam" is a concept of peace and that the word of "Muslim" literally means a "Peaceful Man", a "Peace Loving Man". Can the Muslims really do it? I believe that they can. I believe that we in Bosnia can do it. We cherish both the Bosnian experience of faith, which is unique in many ways, but also, we cherish a European experience of faith which can be traced to the experience of the faith of Andalusia, which is both European and Muslim par excellence. Although it is not completely wrong to talk about a "Bosnian Islam" or a "European Islam", but this phrasing might be misleading because there is no such thing as" Bosnian" or otherwise Islam. There is only one Islam as the Qur'an and the Sunnah define it. However, there are different experiences of that one and the same Islam according to different environments the Muslim live in. We can see that there are differences among the different Muslim nations in understanding and practicing Islam. This should not disturb us at all. On the contrary, we should encourage such diversity among the Muslim nations. This is a great richness of the whole Ummah. We have witnessed it here in Bosnia during the war and peace that our understanding of Islam is not the same as the understanding of some people who came, no doubt with a good intention, to teach us about their understanding of Islam. It is not that they are wrong in their own right, but they are wrong in our own right because we have the right to grasp the meaning of Islam in our own mind and soul and, consequently, we have the responsibility for what we think and what we do. Because, Islam is not only a vision of a transcendental message, but also it is an immanent phenomenon of culture, which is different from one place to another depending on a geographical, climate, social, economic and political ambient where Muslims live as concrete "cultural brokers", so to speak.

Let me conclude with the note that we should be aware of the fact that the idea of pluralism is very much challenged by populism and extremists not only in religion but also in politics where the power to do evil is much greater. The Muslims should ally with those who advocate political and social pluralism and appreciate religious and cultural diversity. The anti-pluralism forces are on the move nowadays. The phenomena of discrimination, ethnic or racial profiling, ethnic cleansing, harassment, Islamophobia, marginalization, migrants, racism, anti-Semitism... are on rise every very. No country, no nation, no religion, no culture, no politics is immune to these evils. Everyone has the right and duty to be vigilant and to do his/her part in promoting good and preventing evil (al-amru bi-l-maˈrūfi wa al-nahyu 'an al-munkari). After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, no one was prepared for the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. Suddenly old terms like chetnik and ustasha found new currency, and a new term surfaced – 'ethnic cleansing' – with its sickening echo of 'final solution'.\*\*

<sup>41</sup> The term ethnic cleansing, a literal translation of the Serbo-Croatian phrase 'etničko čisćenje', was widely employed in the 1990s (though the term first appeared earlier) to describe the brutal treatment of various civilian groups in the conflicts that erupted upon the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These groups included Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) in Bosnia - Herzegovina, Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia, and ethnic Albanians and later Serbs in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The term also has been attached to the treatment by Indonesian militants of the people of East Timor, many of whom were killed or forced to abandon their homes after the public vote in favor of independence in 1999 as well as to the plight of Chechens who fled Grozny and other areas of Chechnya following Russian military operations against Chechen separatists during the 1990s. According to a report issued by the United Nations (UN) secretary-general, the frequent occurrence of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s was attributable to the nature of contemporary armed conflicts, in which ... civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure are not simply by-products of war, but the consequence of the deliberate targeting of non-combatants.... [I]n many conflicts, belligerents target civilians in order to expel or eradicate segments of the population, or for the purpose of hastening military surrender. Ethnic cleansing as a concept has generated considerable controversy.

The upsurge of nationalist sentiment in Eastern Europe raises the question whether the wars in the former Yugoslavia are harbingers of things to come. Will the racist idea of the ethnically pure state crush the humanist ideal of the multicultural society?

In a monumental survey of his book *Yugoslavian Inferno*, Paul Mojzes\*<sup>42</sup>, the internationally recognized authority on religion in Eastern Europe, provides an informative analysis of the perplexed issues that brought about the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Paul Mojzes' explained in a subtle way the phenomena of Serbian *Chetnik* and Croatian *Ustaša* as an example of populism and extremism of a Balkan type that still existent and may be cause for a future conflict. The most effective way to fight such tyranny or abuse is through analysis and articulation; the individual must deconstruct the issue, the problem, and formulate an argument or a solution.



ILLUSTRATION ~ "Muhammad (s) Symbol of Freedom & Honour" - The message of Muslims.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ "Muhammad a.s. je simbol slobode i časti" - poruka muslimana.

Some critics see little difference between it and *genocide*. *Ethnic cleansing - war crime*. Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-cleansing. Accessed 10.10.2021.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Mojzes, Paul: **Yugoslavian Inferno**. The Continium Publishing Company, New York, 1994.

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ILUSTRACIJA ~ Patriotizam u zagrljaju nacionalizma. "Ne samo da Srbija ne prihvaća odgovornost za zločine počinjene u ime srpskog naroda, nego politički tone u početak 90-ih i nacionalizam koji je tada bujao u zemlji", piše New York Times.

ILLUSTRATION ~ Patriotism in the embrace of nationalism. "Not only that Serbia does not accept responsibility for the crimes committed in the name of the Serbian people, but politically it sinks into the beginning of the 90's and the nationalism that flourished in the country at that time,"

writes the New York Times. (direktno, 28.11.2017.)