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NASLIJEĐE RAŠIDA RIĐĀ

RASHID RIĐĀ'S LEGACY

Abstract

This article is a comparative portrayal of three main figures of Islam in modern times, namely Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā with a particular focus on Shykh Rashīd Riḍā’s legacy of a mixture of an Islamic reform with Islamic tradition (*Salafism*). Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī is portrayed as a revolutionary who saw in Islam elements of unity and mobilization. He is described by some as “the father of modern Muslim anticolonialism.” Muḥammad ‘Abduh is described as a pragmatic gradualist who believed in reconciling revelation with reason, advocating for a religion that has essentially a moral function. Both tried to prove that well understood Islam is not incompatible with modernity, and encouraged Muslims to embrace the latter without abandoning the former. Although strongly associated with these two of his teachers, Rashīd Riḍā, however, perceived modernity as a threat and felt that successive concessions to it would lead to the wholesale abandonment of religion. His alternative was an Islam that controls all aspects of individual and social life; this idea, implicit in most of his writings, is made clear in this article as an interplay between modernism and traditionalism (*Salafism*) in Islam that still resonate among some Muslim scholars.

Key words: *Rashīd Riḍā, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, al-“Urwa al-wuthqā, al-Manār, ijtihād, taqlīd, Salafism, shari‘ah, maṣlaḥa, shūrā, Islam, politics.*

RASHID RIḌĀ'S LEGACY

Shaykh Rashīd Riḍā was born in a small village near Tripoli, in present-day Lebanon, in 1865. His family, who claimed to be descended from the Prophet Muḥammad, was reputed for its piety and religious learning, and his father officiated as *imām*.^{*1} He received a traditional education, first in the local *kuttab*,^{*2} then in Tripoli under Shaykh Ḥusayn al-Jisr, a scholar of some renown. He soon felt the urge to put his knowledge and energies at the service of his community and started preaching at the local mosque. Riḍā also went to the coffee houses where the men gathered to talk about religion and organized lessons for the women at the family home.

However, the accidental discovery of several copies of *al-'Urwa al-wuthqā*, among his father's papers was to change the course of Riḍā's life. The periodical, edited from Paris by Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī^{*3} and his collaborator Muḥammad 'Abduh between March and October 1884, circulated widely throughout the Muslim world and in spite of its short life, was hugely influential. Riḍā avidly read his father's issues, then looked for the others (it turned out that Shaykh al-Jisr had them all) and copied them down. He felt that new horizons had opened before him, and wrote to al-Afghānī, who at the time resided in Istanbul as a virtual prisoner of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, asking to become his disciple. But the Sayyid died in 1897, possibly poisoned, and the young man never had a chance to meet him.

Riḍā had more luck with Imam Muḥammad 'Abduh. He met him when the older man, temporarily exiled in Beirut due to his involvement in the *'Urabī revolt*,^{*4} visited Tripoli in the mid-1880s. He went back in 1894 and Riḍā was able to establish a relationship with him. After obtaining his diploma of *ulema* in 1897, Riḍā decided to join 'Abduh in Cairo. He suggested to 'Abduh the publication of a periodical fashioned after *al-'Urwa al-wuthqā* to spread his reformist ideas; a few weeks later, the first issue of *al-Manār* saw the light.

¹ The term *imām* designates both the leader of the collective prayers at the mosque and a venerated religious guide. As we will see, it is the latter sense that applies to Muḥammad 'Abduh, often referred to as *al-ustādh al-imām* - *ustādh* meaning "teacher."

² The *kuttab* pl. *katātīb* was originally a school next to the mosque, where children were taught the religion. In the morning, the pupils would memorize the Qur'an, and in the afternoon, they would practice reading and writing, and learn Arabic grammar and poetry (ad. trans.).

³ The title *sayyid* designates a descendant of the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭima and his cousin 'Alī. The question of al-Afghānī's origin has been the subject of much controversy, and it seems likely that he was not an Afghān but an Iranian trying to hide his Shī'a origins in a predominantly Sunni Muslim world. However, most Islamists refuse to admit this, as if it raised questions about his whole heritage.

See Muḥammad 'Imāra (intro & ed.), *Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī. Al-A'māl al-kāmila*, vol. I. (Beirut: Al-mu'assasa al-'arabiyya li al-dirasāt wa al-nashr, 1979), 19–28; Muḥammad 'Imāra, *Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī al-muftarā 'alay-hi* (Cairo: Dār al-shurūq, 1979), 127–60; al-Sayyid Yusuf, *Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī wa al-thawra al-shāmila* (Cairo: Al-hay'a al mişriyya al-'amma li al-kitāb, 1999), 36–46.

⁴ The *'Urabī revolt*, also known as the *'Urabī Revolution*, was a nationalist uprising in Egypt from 1879 to 1882. It was led by and named for Colonel Ahmed 'Urabī or Orabī. He sought to depose Khudaywī Muḥammad Tawfiq Bāshā as well as an end of British and French influence over the country. (ad.trans.)

Riḍā continued editing it - initially weekly, later monthly - until his death in 1935, and became known as *Ṣāhib al-Manār* (*al-Manār's* proprietor).

Shaykh wrote most of its contents, which included pieces on religious and social issues, attacks on the traditional ulema and the westernized elite, analyses of the international situation, etc. 'Abduh's commentary of the Qur'an, which Riḍā continued after the *Imām's* death, became a regular feature from the sixth volume (1903 – 4), and was later published separately as *Tafsīr al-Manār*. In the same year the section *Fatawā al-Manār* (*al-Manār's* legal opinions, or *fatwās*) appeared, in which readers could ask the Shaykh for advice on religious matters - and, conceivably, he could pose as one of them to raise certain issues. The periodical also reproduced articles on religion, politics and science from other publications that had drawn his attention. According to Hourani, "there is a sense in which, from the time of its foundation, the *al-Manār* was his life."⁵



ILLUSTRATION ~ Riḍā with Imam Muḥammad 'Abduh in Cairo in 1907 after launching the first issue of *al-Manār*.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Riḍā sa Imamom Muḥammadom 'Abduhu u Kairu 1907. poslije pokretanja prvog broja *al-Manāra*.

⁵ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. 1798 –1939* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 226.

Contrary to ‘Abduh, who after his return from exile had shunned politics and concentrated his efforts on educational and judicial reform, Riḍā was an active participant in the political arena. At first, he supported the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against western colonialism, but he disliked Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s despotism; in that spirit, he co-founded the Ottoman Society for Constitutional Government. He had high hopes for the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, but was disenchanted by the new government’s attempts to “Turkify” the Arabs and its repression of dissent; he consequently formed the Decentralization Party with the objective of obtaining autonomy for the Arab provinces of the Empire. During the First World War, Riḍā initially endorsed the Arab revolt led by Ḥusayn, the *Sharīf* of Mecca, but soon became critical of his reliance on the British. In 1919 he went back to his homeland and was elected president of the parliament that proclaimed the independence of Greater Syria under King Faysal. When the British and the French imposed their mandates, he co-organized the Syro-Palestinian Congress that took place in Geneva in 1921 to protest against the partition and occupation of Arab lands and the Zionist ambitions in Palestine. In 1926, he welcomed the *Wahhābī* conquest of Mecca and espoused the Saudi cause. Riḍā died in 1935 on his way back from Suez, where he had gone to see Ibn Sa‘ūd.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Participants in the Syrian-Palestinian Interim Conference in Geneva, 1921 - Riḍā is seated second left.
 ILUSTRACIJA ~ Učesnici sirijsko-palestinske privremene konferencije u Ženevi, 1921. - Riḍā sjedi drugi s lijeve.

Riḍā's Thought

Shaykh Riḍā is not regarded as an original thinker. A cursory examination of his writings seems to indicate that he just repeated and elaborated the ideas of al-Afghānī and 'Abduh. Like them, he yearned for the unadulterated Islam of the first generations, the righteous ancestors (*salaf*), before the Muslim religion was tainted by illegitimate innovations (*bida'*). He rejected the *ulema's* unquestioning imitation of their medieval predecessors (*taqlīd*), and the practice of blindly following a particular school of jurisprudence (*madhhab*). As an alternative to the traditionalists' rigidity, he defended the scholar's right to resort to personal interpretation of the sacred texts (*ijtihād*) in order to adapt Islam to new circumstances, taking into account the public welfare of the community (*maṣlaḥa*). At the same time, he condemned the despotism of Muslim leaders and contended that Islam dictates a consultative system of government (*shūrā*). In addition, he denounced colonialism and the fragmentation of the Islamic world and believed in Muslim unity (*al-jāmi'a al-islāmiyya*).

Moreover, Riḍā went to great lengths to claim 'Abduh's mantle. Shortly after the Imām passed away, Riḍā published a poem in which 'Abduh expressed his belief that God had blessed the Muslim community with a rightly-guided (*rashīd*) leader; Riḍā's critics accused Riḍā of having written that poem himself.⁶ His biography of 'Abduh contains several similar instances in which the Imām seems to designate himself as his successor.⁷ And he did not hesitate to invoke his mentor's authority when he needed to prop his arguments, even when it seems rather unlikely that 'Abduh would have shared his views.⁸ It was not just a matter of personal vanity; after the *Imām's* death, his former pupils had divided into two opposing camps. On one side was the *al-Manār* Party - or the Reform Party (*Ḥizb al-islām*), as Riḍā called it - which insisted on the relevance of Islam for the organization of society and the state. On the other were the secular-minded politicians and intellectuals like Saïd Zaghlūl, the liberal leader of Egyptian independence, or 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq, an Azharī graduate who in his *Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm* argued that Islam was a spiritual religion without political content. Riḍā's fierce campaign against 'Abd al-Rāziq was instrumental in bringing him to trial for his "attack" on Islam and his subsequent "defrocking."⁹

⁶ Aḥmad al-Sharabāṣī, *Rashīd Riḍā, Ṣāḥib al-Manār*. 'Asruḥū wa ḥayātuhū wa maṣadir thaqāfatihī. (Cairo: Maṭabī' al-ahrām al-tijāriyya, 1970), 264–6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 268–70.

⁸ See *al-Manār* XXVII: 10–1, 121 and Rashīd Riḍā, *Al-waḥy al-muḥammadī* (Cairo: Al-mu'tamar al-islāmī, 1956), 11–2: Respectively, Riḍā's enthusiastic support for Ibn Sa'ūd; his scathing criticism of the "atheist" Egyptian University (the future University of Cairo); and his statement that the only solution to European immorality and corruption is the adoption of Islam. On the latter, see 'Abduh's attitude to Europe under the heading Approach to "the Other."

⁹ See *al-Manār* XXVI: 100–4, 212–7.

But to what extent was Riḍā faithful to the legacy of his predecessors? Jamāl al-Bannā - the younger brother of Ḥasan al-Bannā, the founder of the Society of Muslim Brothers - admits that the Shaykh was less revolutionary than al-Afghānī and less intellectual than ‘Abduḥ, but praises him for offering Ḥasan al-Bannā “a version of *Salafism* he could build on.”^{*10} Nazih Ayubi has suggested in passing that there was a fundamental shift in Islamic thought after the *Salafist* pioneers: “[W]hereas the earlier ‘Islamic reformers’ such as Afghani and ‘Abdu [sic] were striving to modernize Islam, the following generation of Islamists such as [Ḥasan] al-Bannā and the Muslim Brothers were striving to Islamize modernity.”^{*11} And, as Olivier Roy has pointed out, the *Salafist* movement initiated by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī is, in its contemporary incarnation, similar to *Wahhabism*.^{*12} In this article, we contend that it was Riḍā’s deviation from the philosophy of al-Afghānī and ‘Abduḥ that brought about the shift observed by Ayubi and Roy, and transformed *Salafism* into a backward-looking ideology ill-prepared to confront the challenges of the modern world. We will concentrate on the *Salafist* authors’ respective attitudes toward three significant issues: tradition and modernity; Islam and politics; and “the Other.”



ILLUSTRATION ~ *Shaykh* Riḍā longed for the unadulterated Islam of the first generations, the righteous ancestors.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Šaykh* Riḍā je žudio za nepatvorenim islamom prvih generacija, pravednih predaka.

¹⁰ Jamāl al-Bannā, *Al-Sayyid Rashīd Riḍā. Munshi’ al-Manār wa rā’id al-salafiyya al-ḥadītha* (Cairo: Dār al-fikr al-islāmī, 2006), 4, 50.

¹¹ Ayubi, Nazih, *Political Islam. Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London & New York: Routledge, 1991), 231.

¹² Roy, Olivier, *Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004), 182.

Tradition and Modernity

For al-Afghānī, returning to the *Salafi* path was a way of circumventing centuries of stagnation and blind imitation. It was a way of recovering the first Muslims' approach to Islam, characterized by the resort to personal judgement and the interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna to deal with the circumstances for which the holy text does not provide a direct ruling - the process known as *ijtihād*. The Sayyid is credited with "reopening the door of *ijtihād*" because, although he was not the first Islamic thinker to propound it, his widespread appeal and influence led to the acceptance of the idea.*¹³ *Khāṭirāt Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Afghānī* ("The Thoughts of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Afghānī"), a collection of lessons and discussions compiled by Lebanese journalist Muḥammad Bāshā al-Makhzūmī, contains this famous quotation:

What does it mean that the door of *ijtihād* is closed? By what text was it closed? Which *imām* said that, after him, no Muslim should use his personal judgement to understand religion, be guided by the Qur'an and the true prophetic traditions and endeavors to widen his understanding of them and deduce, through analogy, what applies to the modern sciences and the needs and requirements of the present?*

Witnessing western encroachment on the Muslim world and the actual occupation of many of its countries (India, Afghanistan, Egypt, etc.), al-Afghānī exhorted Muslims to unite around their religion and stand up to European military, economic and cultural aggression.*¹⁵ But the popular religiosity of his time, dominated by the stagnant legal schools and the heterodox practices of the *Sufi* orders, seemed unable to play the mobilizing role he envisioned; thus, Islam needed to recover its primitive purity. That put him on a collision course with the official guardians of religion, the traditional *ulema*. He sometimes tried to cajole them into supporting his project, addressing them as "the soul of the Muslim community" and emphasizing the importance of their

¹³ Of course, for the Shi'ites the door of *ijtihād* was never closed. In the Sunni world, a few scholars, like Ibn Taymiyya, did not accept its closure, and reforming voices had been demanding its reopening as far back as the XVIII century. Jamāl al-Dīn would have come into contact with one of those voices, that of Shāh Walī Allāh, in his adolescence, when he lived in India;

See Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Dīn "al-Afghani": A Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 26.

¹⁴ Muḥammad Bāshā al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Afghānī*, in Sayyid Hādī Khusraw Shāhī, *Al-āthar al-kāmila. Al-Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Afghānī*, vol. VI. (Cairo: Maktab al-shurūq al-duwaliyya, 2002), 150–1.

¹⁵ Western scholars like Maxime Rodinson, Nikki Keddie and Elie Kedourie have suggested that al-Afghānī was not really concerned about religion but merely appreciated its mobilizing power. Al-Makhzūmī, who frequented the Sayyid in the last years of his life, observed that he had a talent to adapt his discourse to his audience, which is why some left his company believing that he was a religious fanatic, while others were convinced that he was an atheist (*Khāṭirāt*, 159).

contribution to reform; ^{*16} more often, he just felt frustrated by their ignorance and rigidity and accused them of abandoning believers in a state of fragmentation and illegitimate innovations. ^{*17} On the other hand, the Sayyid admired modern science, of which he had acquired some knowledge in the course of his travels, and encouraged his pupils to study it. Influenced by the current of scientific exegesis that had appeared in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, he even argued that the Qur'an should be reinterpreted in the light of the new discoveries. ^{*18}



ILLUSTRATION ~ Muḥammad 'Abduh and his mentor Muḥammad al-Afgāni on the *al-Urwah al-wuthqāu* project.
 ILUSTRACIJA ~ Muḥammad 'Abduhu i njegov mentor Muḥammad al-Afgāni na projektu *al-Urwah al-wuthqāu*.

¹⁶ Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, *Al-A'māl al-kāmila*, vol. II (intro & ed. Muḥammad 'Imāra) (Beirut: Al-mu'assasa al-'arabiyya li al-dirasāt wa-l-nashr, 1981), 54; see also 29, 33.

¹⁷ See al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 137; al-Afghānī, *Al-A'māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 65.

¹⁸ Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 138, 140–2.

While under the sway of Muḥammad al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh was his mouthpiece; although it was he who actually wrote the articles that appeared in *al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā*, the ideas they contained were unquestionably the Sayyid’s. However, ‘Abduh eventually grew disillusioned and skeptical of his mentor’s approach and his immediate concerns became more down-to-earth. He worried that the spread of an imported educational model that neglected religion and the wholesale adoption of foreign legislation that people could not really understand was creating a valueless, and ultimately lawless, society.*¹⁹ An avid reader of Comte, ‘Abduh believed that reform required a framework and that the Muslim world did not have the materials nor the men to build an alternative structure to Islam. “If the religion of Muslims can work these ends and has their confidence, why seek for other means?”*²⁰

His solution was, therefore, overhauling traditional education through the selective introduction of modern disciplines and modernizing the *sharī‘ah* by putting at its core the concept of public interest (*maslaḥa*).*²¹ He tried to do the first during his presidency of the administrative council of al-Azhar and contributed to the second as Grand Mufti of Egypt, but on both counts he was confronted with the resistance of the traditional *ulema*. The *Imām* faced up to them, defending his notion of Islam as a rational religion that encourages enquiry and allows for interpretation,*²² but he lost most of his battles.

At the same time, ‘Abduh answered non-Muslim critics of Islam. He wrote in *Al-Islām wa al-naṣrāniyya ma’a al-‘ilm wa al-madaniyya* (“Islam and Christianity vis-à-vis Science and Civilization”), a reply to Christian author Farah Antoine:

When the Muslims were scholars, they had two eyes; one looked at this world and the other, at the next. When they started to imitate, they closed one of their eyes and polluted the other with what was foreign to them, thus losing both pursuits. They will not rediscover them unless they open the eye they have closed and clean the one they have polluted.*²³

The early writings of Rashīd Riḍā were very much influenced by al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh, and he considered the *ulema* the biggest obstacle to the reform of Islam and, by extension, of the Muslim world. In the third and

¹⁹ Muhammad ‘Abduh, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. I (intro & ed. Muḥammad ‘Imāra) (Beirut & Cairo: Dār al-shurūq, 1993), 331–5, 337–42; see also Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 137–8.

²⁰ Quoted in Charles C. Adams (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 110.

²¹ By reformulating the concept of *maslaḥa*, which had been marginal in classical jurisprudence, ‘Abduh legitimated the use of reason to decide what is in the best interest of the Muslim community whilst maintaining the trappings of tradition. Khadduri has indicated that it was the influence of Western legal thought that led to this reformulation (quoted in Shahrough Akhavi, *Sunni modernist theories of social contract in contemporary Egypt*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35 (2003), 46–7, n. 40).

²² See Muḥammad ‘Abduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, in Muḥammad ‘Imāra (ed.), *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila li al-imām Muḥammad ‘Abduh*, vol. III (Beirut & Cairo: Dār al-shurūq, 1993; 369–490), 454, 483; Muhammad ‘Abduh, *Al-Islām wa al-naṣrāniyya ma’a al-‘ilm wa al-madaniyya*, in Muḥammad ‘Imāra (ed.), vol. III. (Beirut & Cairo: Dār al-shurūq; 1993; 257–368), 316–8; *Tafsīr al-Manār* I: 269.

²³ ‘Abduh, 363.

fourth volumes of *al-Manar* (1900 to 1902), he published a series of articles entitled *Muḥāwarāt al-muṣliḥ wa al-muqallid* (literally, “Conversations between the reformer and the imitator”). In this work, a young *Salafist* intellectual debates with a traditional shaykh and, buttressing his arguments with a mixture of erudition and earnestness, gradually earns the older man’s respect and convinces him of the soundness of his position.^{*24} Throughout his life, Riḍā criticized the *ulema’s* aversion to adapting Islam to the new times. That criticism had led many among the educated elite to believe that the way to progress meant abandoning religion, as a result of which politicians introduced foreign institutions to cope with the challenges that the *sharī’ah* had become incapable of dealing with.^{*25} But the seemingly unstoppable advancement of secularism made Riḍā turn his attention to the “threat” posed by the westernized modernizers, and his attacks against them were increasingly fierce, including accusations of atheism, immorality, even treason.^{*26} He wrote in the introduction to his review of ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq’s *Al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm*:

The enemies of Islam continue to endeavour to topple its throne, destroy its dominion, invalidate its laws and enslave the peoples that worship God through its teachings. They resort to fire and the sword, cunning and deceit, ideas and attitudes. They pervert doctrines and morals, attack the essence and the character of the Muslim community, sever all the ties that bind together individuals and peoples so that they become easier for the covetous to devour, prey to the beasts of colonialism.^{*27}

At the same time, a kind of literalism came to dominate Riḍā’s thought, and he progressively distanced himself from the figurative interpretation of the Qur’an favored by al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh. In one of his legal opinions, he ruled that anybody who does not believe in the historical existence of Adam and Abraham cannot be counted as a Muslim, and dismissed the possibility of reason or science contradicting any unequivocal Qur’anic text.^{*28} His own reading of the holy book became ever more constricted by the text: for instance, in regard to verse 8:60, “Make ready for them all thou canst of (armed) force and of horses tethered,”^{*29} he insisted on interpreting the term “horses” literally, claiming that cavalry continued to be an essential element of modern warfare.^{*30} That volume of the Commentary was published in the early 1930s. Unsurprisingly, the

²⁴ For a study of these Conversations, see Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, *Portrait of the intellectual as a young man: Rashīd Riḍā’s Muḥāwarāt al-muṣliḥ wa al-muqallid. (1906)* in *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 12(1), (2001), 93–104.

²⁵ See *Al-Manār* VII: 51–2, X: 678–9, XXIV: 65, XXVII: 126–7.

²⁶ See *Al-Manār* XXIV: 63, XXVII: 127, XXX: 127, XXXIII: 462–3. The Shaykh referred to the westernizers as *mutafarnij*, an offensive term derived from *franj* (Frank, foreigner) which dates back to the time of the Crusades.

²⁷ *Al-Manār* XXVI: 100.

²⁸ *Al-Manār* XXVIII: 581, 583.

²⁹ The translation of the Qur’an used is M. Picktall’s.

³⁰ *Tafsīr al-Manār* X: 139.

Shaykh expressed his admiration for Ibn Ḥazm, the leading proponent of the *ẓāhirī* school of jurisprudence, which was so extreme in its literalism that it never overcame its extremely marginal status, and quoted him with increasing frequency.*³¹



ILLUSTRATION ~ *Shaykh* Riḍā's *Tafsīr al-Manār*, edited by him from 'Abduhu's lectures.
 ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Šaykh* Riḍāov *Tafsīr al-Manār*, kojeg je uredio iz 'Abduhuovih predavanja.

³¹ See *Tafsīr al-Manār* VII: 144–5; *al-Manār* XX: 98–103; XXVI: 276; XXVIII: 264–5; XXXII: 3.

Two telling examples of the different attitudes to tradition of Riḍā and his predecessors are their respective stances *vis-à-vis* the *Sunna* and the medieval scholars. Al-Afghānī has been quoted as employing the formula “the Koran and the authentic Hadith-s” to refer to the fundamentals of Islamic doctrine;^{*32} more often, though, he just mentioned the holy book.^{*33} In fact, while he regularly quoted Qur’anic verses, al-Afghānī very rarely cited any tradition - which is not surprising given that he was probably a Shi’ite, and the Shi’a reject the Sunni collections.^{*34} ‘Abduh, for his part, was avowedly skeptical of most *ḥadīths* - many of which were fabricated during the first centuries of Islam to fill in legal voids or justify dynastic claims - and only accepted as evidence those *mutawātira* (reported by a multitude of sources). At least once, he implied that only the Qur’an could be considered authoritative.^{*35} In Riḍā’s case, Jamāl al-Banna relates a controversy in which Azharī *ulema* Muḥammad Abu Zahū criticized the Shaykh for stating that both the Prophet and his companions had tried to prevent the compilation of *ḥadīths* to avoid their sacralization.^{*36} However, Riḍā’s own writings are punctuated by traditions, and he himself identified this as the main difference between the part of *Tafsīr al-Manār* he drafted from ‘Abduh’s lectures and his own contribution to the *Commentary*.^{*37}

It is unquestionable that both Al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh, who had received a traditional religious education, had a sound knowledge of their treatises. Nevertheless, in keeping with their “back-to-basics” approach, they tended to avoid any mention of them unless they could use them to support their controversial stances. It is noteworthy that ‘Abduh - who was often accused of unorthodoxy due to his rationalist, almost *Mu’tazilite*, leanings - identified with *ulema* who had been deemed mavericks in their time, like al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyya.^{*38} In contrast, Riḍā regularly cited the medieval scholars, and resorted to their arguments more and more frequently. Admittedly, in some cases this could be interpreted as an attempt to beat the traditionalists on their own terms — as in the above-mentioned *Conversations* between the reformer and the imitator — but that does not apply to other writings, like *al-Khilāfa aw al-imāma al-‘uzmā* (“The Caliphate or the Supreme Imamate”). Written after the relegation of the caliph to a merely ceremonial role by Kemal Atatürk, *al-Khilāfa*

³² Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 151.

³³ See Al-Afghānī, *Al-‘amāl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 29; Jamāl al-Dīn Al-Afghānī, *Al-radd ‘alā al-dahriyyīn*, in Sayyid Hādī Khusraw Shāhī, *Al-āthar al-kāmila. Al-Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Afghānī* vol. II–III. (Cairo: Maktab al-shurūq al-duwaliyya, 2002), 127–196.

³⁴ The Shi’a are critical of the *ṣaḥāba* (the Prophet’s companions), whom they accuse of having usurped the *caliphate* from ‘Alī, and do not accept the traditions reported by them. They have their own collections, whose sources are their *imāms*.

³⁵ ‘Abduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 298.

³⁶ Al-Banna, *Al-Sayyid Rashīd Riḍā*, 31–6.

³⁷ *Tafsīr al-Manār* I: 16.

³⁸ ‘Abduh, *Al-Islām wa al-naṣrāniyya*, 359.

The *Salafists* contributed to the rehabilitation of Ibn Taymiyya, a Hanbali scholar who, already in the XIII century, had criticized the traditional schools of jurisprudence (*madhhabs*) and, by rejecting that consensus (*ijmā’*) could be possible after the Prophet’s generation, had claimed the right to personal interpretation of the Koran and the Sunna (*ijtihād*).

See Noel J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 202–3.

However, very often Hanbali literalism leaves little space to *ijtihād*. Unfortunately, later Salafists and radical Islamists only seem to have adopted that literalism, together with Ibn Taymiyya’s fondness for excommunicating fellow Muslims.

offers a reformulation of the medieval theory of the *caliphate* devised by al-Mawardī (d. 1058), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) and al-Taftazānī (d. 1389), who are quoted extensively (see below). In addition, *al-Manār* reproduced large extracts of works by Hanbalite authors like Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1350), and its printing press published many of them in full.




ILLUSTRATION – Interior of the Sultana al-Mu'ayyada Mosque, Cairo.

Islam and Politics

As we have seen, *Salafism* started off as a political movement: Al-Afghānī perceived the threat that European powers posed to the Islamic world and urged Muslims to come together in order to face up to that threat. Moreover, judging that tyranny and arbitrariness had rendered the east weak, he recovered the almost forgotten idea of *shūrā* (consultation) - an old Arab tribal practice only mentioned twice in the Qur'an^{*39} - and made of it an Islamic equivalent of the western parliamentary system. But the Sayyid's discourse was far from unambiguous. Sometimes he asserted, almost messianically, that all that was needed to guarantee unity, justice and greatness was for rulers to do as the *salaf* had done and implement the *sharī'ah*;^{*40} he defended the rather un-Islamic idea that the people have the right to the rise in arms and choose or "unchoose" their sovereign.^{*41}

In the absence of that [strong, fair-minded] man [that is required], the community must choose a king on condition that he is trustworthy and submits to the fundamental law [i.e., the constitution]. On taking that oath, he will be crowned and informed that the crown will stay on his head as long as he preserves the integrity of the constitution. But if he commits perjury and betrays it, his head will become crownless... or his crown will become headless!^{*42}

In later life, Al-Afghānī's revolutionary leanings led him to look favorably on socialism, which he had previously denounced as a foreign, materialistic and destructive ideology.^{*43} He then talked about an "Islamic socialism," superior to the "vindictive" western socialism, whose seed was already noticeable in pre-Islamic Bedouin society and was bolstered in Islam through institutions like the obligation to give alms (*zakāt* and *ṣadaqa*) and the prohibition of usury (*ribā*).^{*44} He predicted the arrival of an Islamic socialism in which "all

³⁹ Qur'an, 3: 159 and 42: 38.

⁴⁰ See Al-Afghānī, *Al-A'māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 34–6; 49–50.

⁴¹ The *ulema* have traditionally been extremely conservative when it comes to challenging the powers. In their eyes, *fitna* (internal discord) is the greatest of evils.

⁴² See Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 84; See also Al-Afghānī, *Al-A'māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 329.

⁴³ Al-Afghānī, *Al-Radd 'alā al-dahriyyīn*, 176–8. n

⁴⁴ Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 160ff.

The *zakāt*, which is the percentage of their wealth Muslims must give to the less fortunate, is one of the five pillars of Islam. *Ṣadaqa* is spontaneous charity, which Islam encourages. *Ribā*, or usury, was outlawed by the Qur'an. Incidentally, Al-Afghānī believed that only abusive rates of interest should be considered *ribā* and, therefore, unlawful (*ibid.* 163–4). That view would be shared by Riḍā, who dealt with the issue in many of his articles and *fatwās* (e.g. *al-Manār* x: 435–9; XXIV: 192–3; XXVIII: 577–8; XXXI: 37–46; XXXIII: 449–56). That contrasts with the opinion of contemporary Islamists, who have based the establishment of Islamic banking on the idea that *ribā* means interest tout court.

men realise that they were created from the same dust and the same soul.”^{*45}

‘Abduh did not share the Sayyid’s revolutionary bent. In his youth he wrote a number of newspaper articles dealing with the subject of constitutional government,^{*46} but he rejected radical solutions and argued for gradualism and education as the best means to bring about change.^{*47} It has been remarked that those articles are practically void of religious references “in spite of the use, here and there, of the word *sharī’ah*.”^{*48} The *Imām* was briefly imprisoned and then exiled due to his involvement in the ‘*Urabī* revolt - although, in reality, he had been a reluctant participant and tried to exercise a moderating influence over the revolutionaries.^{*49} By the time he was allowed to return to Egypt, he had become disenchanted with politics; in his unfinished autobiography, he remembered that he decided to leave the fight against tyranny “to destiny and to the hand of God, because I learnt that [having a fair government] is a fruit that nations reap after they sow it and nurture it for many years.”^{*50} Pragmatically, he decided to work with the British consul-general, Lord Cromer, and from the official posts he was able to secure, he concentrated his efforts on the reform of the judicial system, the *awqāf* (religious endowments) and the prestigious al-Azhar teaching mosque.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Lord Cromer, a memory from Egypt, 1905.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Lord Cromer, uspomena iz Egipta, 1901.

⁴⁵ Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 175.

⁴⁶ See ‘Abduh, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. I, 389–93; 395–9.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 323–6; 327–30; 337–42.

⁴⁸ ‘Izzat Qurani, *Tārīkh al-fikr al-siyāsī wa al-ijtimā‘ī fī miṣr al-ḥadītha* (Cairo: Al-hay’a al-miṣriyya al-‘āmma li al-kitāb, 2006), 437.

⁴⁹ See ‘Abduh, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. I, 613–5.

⁵⁰ Muḥammad ‘Abduh, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. II (intro & ed. Muḥammad ‘Imāra) (Beirut & Cairo: Dār al-shurūq, 1993), 112.

However, he saw the western parliamentary system as a model for Egypt^{*51} and, in a clear attempt to liken the *caliphate* to parliamentary democracy, pretended that the *caliph* was a civil, not a religious, ruler:

Religion does not confer [the *caliph*] any distinction whatsoever in understanding the [Holy] Book and the divine commands [...] Furthermore, he is obeyed as long as he follows the way of the Book and the *Sunna* [...] But if his actions deviate from the Book and the *Sunna*, [the governed] must replace him - unless the harm of replacing him outweighs its benefit. It was the Muslim community - or its delegates - that designated him, and it holds sway over him and deposes him if it deems it in its interest, because he is a temporal ruler in all respects.^{*52}

Although ‘Abduh tried to convince him to stay out of politics, Rashīd Riḍā believed that the problems beleaguering Muslims required political as well as religious reform.^{*53} At first, the Shaykh was a supporter of the Ottoman Empire as a bastion of Muslim strength and, recovering an old idea of *al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā*, he proposed the creation of an Islamic Society (*al-jam‘iyya al-islāmiyya*) under the leadership of the *caliph*, with headquarters in Mecca and offices all over the Muslim world. Its members - Sunni, Shi‘a and *‘Ibādī ulema* - would produce a common doctrine and draft a modern code of law based on the *sharī‘ah*.^{*54} As we have mentioned, Riḍā eventually realized that the Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd was not willing to introduce any measure of consultative government, and that realization led him to back - briefly - the revolution of the Young Turks and, during the Great War, the Hashemite led Arab revolt. But after the war, Arabs and Muslims lived two traumatic events: the western partition and occupation of Arab lands, which was widely - and rightly - regarded as a betrayal of the promises the Allies had made during the war; and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the rise to power of Kemal Atatürk who, as part of his forced secularization of Turkish society stripped the *caliph* of his temporal powers in 1922 and abolished the *caliphate* completely two years later.

Atatürk’s actions were a shock to traditionalist Muslims for whom the *caliphate* represented the symbol of Islamic unity and the last line of defense against the west’s political and cultural onslaught. After having been so critical of ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd and supporting the Arab revolt, Riḍā became an ardent defender of the *caliphate* as the only legitimate form of government for Muslims, and wrote a series of articles in volumes xxiii and xxiv

⁵¹ See ‘Abduh, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. I, 819–824.

⁵² ‘Abduh, *Al-Islām wa al-naṣrāniyya*, 307–8.

In other texts, ‘Abduh affirms that the *caliphate* should be re-established “on a more spiritual basis” (see *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. I, 867), hankers after a “benevolent dictator” (*Ibid.*, 845–6), or implies that the republic is the most advanced form of government (*Ibid.*, 342). It has been noted that ‘Abduh’s political thought is rather fragmentary; see Malcolm H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform. The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966), 146–52.

⁵³ *Al-Manār*, X: 675–7.

⁵⁴ *l-Manār*, XI: 765–71, 811–2; x: 673–6, 680. The *Ibadi* (*‘Ibādī*) sect is the only remnant of the Kharijites who left the army of ‘Alī, the fourth *caliph*, after the battle of Ṣiffīn, and followed their own puritanical and intolerant version of Islam.

of *al-Manār* (1922–3) that would be collected later under the title “The *Caliphate* or the Supreme *Imāmate*” (see above).^{*55} In an historical overview, he restated conventional wisdom according to which Muslim decadence started with the end of the period of the rightly-guided *caliphs* (i.e., the first four successors of Muḥammad), when Mu‘āwiya usurped the *caliphate* and turned it into a dynasty.^{*56} In the “true *caliphate*,” as Riḍā saw it, the *caliph* is chosen by the leaders and representatives of the community, *ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqq* (literally, “those who tie and untie”), among the candidates that fulfil the conditions stipulated by the medieval *ulema*: they must be male, free, courageous, sensible, *mujtahid* (capable of *ijtihād*), *qurayshī* (a member of the Prophet’s tribe), etc.^{*57} But ultimately, he said, sovereignty resides in the nation, which delegates it – Riḍā never says how – to its trusted leaders, *ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqq*^{*58}; the *caliph* is merely a *primus inter pares* who must seek the advice of the representatives of the community and respect their *ijmā’*.^{*59}



ILLUSTRATION – Carl Ponheimer: Panoramic Overview of Mecca (1803), Khalili collections, No. ARC.pt 75.

ILUSTRACIJA – Carl Ponheimer: Panoramski pregled Meke (1803.), Khalili kolekcija, br. ARC.pt 75.

⁵⁵ For an in-depth analysis of Riḍā’s theory of the *caliphate*, see Kerr, *Islamic Reform*, 153–186.

⁵⁶ *Al-Manār*, XXIV: 43–5.

⁵⁷ *Al-Manār*, XXIII: 737–8.

⁵⁸ *Al-Manār*, XXIV: 187–8; 58–9.

⁵⁹ *Al-Manār*, XXIII: 749–752; XXIV: 33; 187–8. Riḍā would insist on several other occasions that the concept of popular sovereignty is present in Islam (e.g. *Al-Manār*, XXXIII: 211; Riḍā, *Al-waḥy al-muḥammadī*, 236).

After thus “casting Islamic principles in the mold of modern liberalism,”^{*60} Riḍā contended that the *caliphate* was superior to western parliamentary democracy, arguing that *ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd* are like members of parliament but “wiser and more virtuous,” and that, whatever levels of justice western legislators have arrived at, the *sharī‘ah* had set first, and better.^{*61} Regarding the possibility of restoring the *caliphate*, he admitted that conditions were not favorable but insisted that if it were established in a small territory, all Muslims would rally around it, just like Catholics rally around the Pope.^{*62} In the meantime, the Reform Party should educate public opinion and prepare to assume their responsibilities as *ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd*:

Those who aspire to political leadership and the status of ‘tying and untying’ in the Islamic countries outside the Arabian Peninsula form three groups: The imitators of the different books of jurisprudence [i.e., the legal schools]; the imitators of the European laws and systems; and the Reform Party, which combines an independent understanding of religious jurisprudence and Islamic rulings and the essence of European civilization. That Party is the [only] one able to eradicate the problems of the Muslim community and to do what needs to be done in order to revive the *imāmate* - if only it became strong and obtained money and men. And, through its position in the middle, it can attract to it those from the two extremes wishing to renovate the community.^{*63}

Towards the end of his life, Rida actively promoted the *Wahhābī* cause. This contrasts with ‘Abduh’s denunciation of the movement, which he had opposed not only because it weakened the Ottoman Empire to the benefit of the colonial powers, but also because he disliked its literalism and coarseness.^{*64} The Shaykh had celebrated Ibn Sa‘ūd’s victory over the Rashīdis — who were allied to the Ottomans — as early as 1904,^{*65} but it was not until the end of the First War World that *Al-Manār* became the most fervent champion of

⁶⁰ Kerr, *Islamic Reform*, 175.

It has been pointed out that Rida’s thought often seems like an Islamic reformulation of Western concepts (e.g. Gardet and Laoust, in *ibid.*, 164). Kerr maintains that that was not his conscious intention, but we believe that it was more conscious than the Shaykh himself would have admitted.

⁶¹ *Al-Manār*, XXIV: 59, 272.

Elsewhere, Riḍā, reiterated that the *caliphate* is the best system of government that humankind has ever known — better, of course, than the parliamentary system; see *Al-Manār*, XXVI: 102; Riḍā, *Al-Waḥy al-muḥammadī*, 237.

⁶² *Al-Manār*, XXIV: 198.

Some authors have stated that the caliphate model proposed by Riḍā is similar to the Catholic papacy (e.g. Bobby S. Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear. Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London, New York: Zed Books, 2003), 61; Sami Zubaida, *Islam and nationalism: continuities and contradictions*, in *Nations and Nationalism* 10(4) (2004), 410–1). However, the “spiritual *caliphate*” was, for the Shaykh, a first step towards a *caliphal* government with temporal powers.

⁶³ *Al-Manār*, xxiv: 62.

⁶⁴ ‘Abduh, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. I, 869; *Al-Islām wa al-naṣrāniyya*, 332.

⁶⁵ Al-Sharbāṣī, *Rashīd Riḍā, ṣāhib al-Manār*, 159.

Wahhābism. In 1920, Riḍā asserted that its founder, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, had renewed Islam in the Nejd (the mountainous region in the center of the Arabian Peninsula), and that he could have renewed it in all of the Muslim world were it not for the conspiracies of his enemies and the excessive zeal of his supporters.*⁶⁶ By 1926, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb is saluted as “the ‘renewer’ of the XII (*Hegira*) century”*⁶⁷ and any reference to extremism has disappeared. The **Wahhābis’** initial failure is attributed to the Ottomans (aided by Egyptian Khudaywī Muḥammad ‘Alī) and to “the country of the Satanic ruses” (i.e., Britain).*⁶⁸ Riḍā welcomed the Saudi conquest of Mecca, presenting it as “a new, longed-for period for Islam, an auspicious opportunity to renew its guidance and recover its glory,”*⁶⁹ and he pressed the Reform Party to support the Wahhābis against the three “dangers” that “destroy Islamic unity from the inside and may be backed by foreign ploys”: the “Shi’a fanatics”; the “ignorant grave-worshippers” (i.e., the *Sufis*) and the “Westernised preachers of atheism.”*⁷⁰



ILLUSTRATION – A rare photo of Muḥammād Rashīd Riḍā in the company of his associates.
 ILUSTRACIJA – Rijetka fotografija Muḥammāda Rashīda Riḍāe u društvu njegovih suradnika.

⁶⁶ *Al-Manār*, XXII: 136–7.

⁶⁷ According to a prophetic *Ḥadīth*, “At the turn of each century, God will send to this community someone who will renew its religion.” Riḍā’s “renewers” include ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (the so-called “fifth of the rightly-guided *caliphs*”) and the jurists and theologians Ibn Hanbal, al-Ash‘arī, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim (*Al-Manār*, xxxii: 3). It seems quite likely that the Shaykh aspired to be considered the renewer of his century (see *Al-Manār*, xxx: 116–8).

⁶⁸ *Al-Manār*, XXVI: 205.

⁶⁹ *Al-Manār*, XXVII: 5.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 10–18. Economic factors may have contributed to Riḍā’s unconditional support for Ibn Sa‘ūd. In an otherwise rather complimentary work, Yusuf quotes a letter in which the Shaykh reveals that his printing press is making a lot of money publishing for the Saudis; see al-Sayyid Yusuf, *Rashīd Riḍā wa al-‘awda ilā manhaj al-salaf* (Cairo: Mīrīt li al-nashr wa al-ma‘lūmāt, 2000), 52–3.

Approach to “the Other”

In the Muslim world, otherness is first and foremost represented by the Islamic minorities (usually the Shī‘a), and by the *dhimma* or “protected peoples” (Jews and Christians). Al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh were remarkably tolerant towards that “close other.” Given his own origin, it is only normal that the Sayyid would encourage the unity of Sunnis and Shi‘ites. He argued that the differences between the two groups had been magnified and exploited by greedy princes seeking to increase their dominions, and that the dispute that had divided them — i.e., whether ‘Ali should have been the first *caliph* — was no longer relevant.^{*71} Similarly, he urged Sunnis to accept the Shi‘ite Persians as fellow Muslims.^{*72} But the unity he envisioned did not include only Muslims: influenced by French historian François Guizot, al-Afghani conceived Islam as a civilization that encompassed all Orientals.^{*73} The opening editorial of *al-‘Urwa al-wuthqā* states that the newspaper is addressed to “Orientals in general and Muslims in particular”;^{*74} and its articles advocate interconfessional unity and exhort Muslims to treat non-Muslims with fairness and kindness.^{*75} In *Khāṭirāt*, he is quoted as calling attention to the common traits of the three monotheisms, which, in his opinion, share principles and aims.^{*76}

‘Abduh was imbued with the same liberal spirit. Symptomatic of his tolerance of non-Sunni Muslims is his interpretation of a *ḥadīth* in which Muḥammad prophesized that, after his death, the Muslim community would be divided into seventy-three sects of which only one would be saved; the *Imam* argued that no Muslim could be sure of belonging to the saved sect and that, in any case, it is quite possible that all surviving sects belong to that group.^{*77} He also embraced non-Muslims as full citizens: the program of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, which he co-drafted in 1881, described the party as “political and non-denominational,” and declared that all Egyptians, Muslims, Christians and Jews, “are brothers and have the same political and legal rights.”^{*78} During his exile in Beirut, he co-founded an organization to promote ecumenical dialogue, and when the Egyptian press launched a campaign against the Undersecretary of Justice Buṭrus Ghālī and, by extension, against all Copts, he wrote an article defending both Ghālī and the “Coptic brothers” and criticizing sectarianism.^{*79}

⁷¹ Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 152-3.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 229-33.

⁷³ The term he uses is *sharqiyyūn* from *sharq*, “East”; its counterpoint is *gharbiyyūn*, “Westerners”; see Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 114-5.

⁷⁴ Al-Afghānī, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 345.

⁷⁵ See Al-Afghānī, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 32, 46.

⁷⁶ Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 177-9; 181-3.

⁷⁷ *Tafsīr al-Manār*, VIII: 220-2.

⁷⁸ ‘Abduh, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. I, 404.

⁷⁹ ‘Abduh, *Al-A‘māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 747-51; see also Rashīd Riḍā, *Tarīkh al-ustādh al-imām al-shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abduh*, vol. I. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Manār, 1931), 917-20.

In private correspondence with an English parson, he highlighted the features common to all monotheisms and indicated that the true religion of God shines through them all.^{*80} Finally, he famously issued *fatwās* declaring the animals sacrificed by Jews and Christian *ḥalāl* (i.e., “permissible”) to Muslims.^{*81}



ILLUSTRATION ~ An early photo of the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus, where Rashīd Riḍā lectured in 1908.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Rana fotografija Omajadske džamije u Damasku, gdje je Rashīd Riḍā držao predavanja 1908.

In contrast, Riḍā was much less tolerant of the Other. In one of his few direct criticisms of ‘Abduh, he rejected the *Imām’s* reading of the *ḥadīth* alluded to above, stating unequivocally that the “saved sect” was the Salafist-Reformist, i.e., his own.^{*82} He depicted the Shi’ite creed as the result of a Jewish and /or Zoroastrian conspiracy aiming at perverting Islam and weakening the Arabs,^{*83} and went as far as blaming the Shi’a for the Tatar and Crusader invasions.^{*84} He also contributed to exacerbating communal tensions in Egypt, particularly high in the years before the First World War.^{*85} In a series of articles published in 1911 and which

⁸⁰ Quoted B. Michel & Moustapha Abdel Rāzīk, *Risāla al-tawḥīd. Exposé de la religion musulmane* (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1925), XLVI.n

⁸¹ See ‘Abduh, *Al-A’māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 509–510; Kerr, *Islamic Reform*, 145–6.

⁸² *Tafsīr al-Manār*, VIII: 223.

⁸³ *Al-Manār*, XXII: 177; *Tafsīr al-Manār*, VIII: 225–6.

⁸⁴ *Al-Manār*, XXVII: 13. In the Conversations between the reformer and the imitator, written when Riḍā still thought that the traditional ulema were the main obstacle, he had blamed the Tatar invasion on the fanaticism of the Shāfi’ī and Ḥanafī schools of jurisprudence; see *Al-Manār*, IV: 206.

⁸⁵ Riḍā resented being considered a foreigner in Egypt, and bitterly complained that many Egyptians preferred the Copts to Syrian or Arabian Muslims (e.g. *Al-Manār* XI: 340; XXVII: 119; see also Al-Sharbāshī, *Rashīd Riḍā, ṣāḥib Al-Manār*, 138–9). It is quite possible that such resentment contributed to his negative attitude towards the Copts.

would be compiled under the title *al-Muslimūn wa al-qibṭ* ("The Muslims and the Copts"), he deplored the Muslims' naivety and divisions, which were exploited by the "duplicious" Copts, and lamented the adoption of nationalistic slogans that, in his view, could only favor that minority^{*86} He mocked the Copts' claim to be descended from the "heathen, God-hating" Pharaohs and their demand to accede to positions "for which they lack the experience."^{*87} Finally, he referred to the 1911 Muslim congress - celebrated as a response to another in which the Copts had demanded equal rights - as "the event that has gladdened me more since my arrival in Egypt."^{*88} But the Copts were not his only Christian targets: Rida did not hesitate to accuse oriental Christians in general of being tools in the hands of the colonial powers...^{*89} or even of conspiring with them and with the "atheist Westernised" against Islam.^{*90}



ILLUSTRATION ~ The Third National Congress, in Haifa, British Mandate of Palestine — 14 December 1920.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Treći nacionalni kongres, u Haifi, britanski mandat Palestine — 14. decembra 1920.

⁸⁶ *Al-Manār*, XIV: 112–3.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 222–3, 287.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 290.

⁸⁹ *Al-Manār*, XXIV: 145; XXVI: 699–703.

⁹⁰ *Al-Manār*, XXVI: 100.

Rida was not kinder to the other significant minority of the Middle East: the Jews. His comments must be put in perspective. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the Zionist plan to create a Jewish state in Palestine was a source of concern for Arabs and Muslims alike. However, the Shaykh did not focus his attacks on Zionism, but directed them to Jews in general. In the first of two articles entitled *Thawrat Filisṭīn* (“The Palestine Revolution”), he listed a series of “established facts” about the Jews which, in fact, are just a collection of anti-Semitic slurs - many of them, it must be said, without precedent in the Islamic tradition: Jews are selfish and chauvinist, cunning and perfidious, and deem it legitimate to oppress, exploit, even exterminate, other peoples.*⁹¹ They introduced the philosophy of Averroes in Europe in order to undermine the power of the Catholic Church, which had mistreated them.*⁹² They founded freemasonry - the word itself would be a reference to the reconstruction of the Temple of Solomon - and, through it, they manipulated the Bolsheviks against the Russian Tsar and the Young Turks, against the *caliphate*.*⁹³ In addition, said Riḍā, they created capitalism as a tool to enslave the whole world through their money, which buys them power and influence, because they lack the courage to fight.*⁹⁴

In the nineteenth century, there erupted in the Muslim world a different “Other”, foreign and threatening: the European powers. Bernard Lewis has described how, after a period of relative isolation and intellectual stagnation - which the author attributes to complacency - the Muslims “discovered” Europe. He writes, possibly with a certain degree of exaggeration:

An eighteenth-century Ottoman knew as much of the states and nations of Europe as a nineteenth-century European about the tribes and peoples of Africa — and regarded them with the same slightly amused disdain. Only the growing sense of threat begins to bring a change in this attitude, and even then, it is slow and gradual.*⁹⁵

Although the *Salafist* movement was partly a response to western aggression, Riḍā’s predecessors had not been intrinsically anti-western. It is true that al-Afghānī was ferociously opposed to the colonial powers, in particular, Britain, which is not surprising given his own personal experience: he witnessed the 1857 Indian mutiny when he was still an adolescent, lost the prime-ministership of Afghanistan and had to flee the country when the British helped overthrow Sultan Muḥammad A’am in 1868, and was expelled from Egypt in 1879 at their instance. He repeatedly denounced the Europeans’ “divide and rule” strategy*⁹⁶ and passionately urged

⁹¹ *Al-Manār*, XXVI: 385–7.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 386.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 387–8.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 387, 392–3.

⁹⁵ Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 168.

⁹⁶ Al-Afghānī, *Al-A’māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 44, 346; Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 118, 229–30.

Orientalists to unite and rise up, “and live happily in freedom and independence or die, without them, as heroes and martyrs.”^{*97} He worried that Muslims risked losing their identity and warned that “Orientals should not start from where Westerners have ended.”^{*98} He encouraged them to be proud of their heritage, reminding them that Muslim scientific discoveries had preceded those of the Europeans^{*99} and arguing that the Protestant Reformation, which liberated Europe from the yoke of the Church, had been inspired by Islam.^{*100} However, he travelled widely throughout Europe, taking refuge in its capitals for more or less extended periods; he had European friends, including the poet William Blunt, who may have financed *al-'Urwa al-wuthqā*; and he expressed his admiration towards eminently western values like individualism.^{*101}



ILLUSTRATION ~ When the British helped overthrow Sultan Muḥammad A'am in 1868, al-Afghānī lost his prime ministership in Afghanistan and had to leave the country. (Peiwar Kotal, reg. num. 1878-06-15-1, detail)

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Kada su Britanci pomogli svrgavanju sultana Muḥammada A'ama 1868. godine al-Afghānī je izgubio premijersko mjesto u Afganistanu i morao napustiti zemlju. (Peiwar Kotal, ev. br. 1878-06-15-1)

‘Abduh also cautioned Muslims against imitating the West, although his main concern seems to have been their adopting the outward trappings of modernity without the intellectual development that should precede them, and the effects of that on morality.^{*102} And he was a passionate defender of Islam against the attacks of the Orientalists.

⁹⁷ Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 246; see also 119–20; Al-Afghānī, *Al-A'māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 32–3.

⁹⁸ Al-Afghānī, *Al-A'māl al-kāmila*, vol. II, 344–5; see also Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 121–2.

⁹⁹ Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 143–9. Al-Afghānī even ended up claiming that the Muslims had been the first to formulate the theory of evolution (Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 154–8), which he had initially ridiculed (Al-Afghānī 2002: 138–40).

¹⁰⁰ Al-Afghānī, *Al-radd 'alā al-dahriyyīn*, 193.

¹⁰¹ Al-Makhzūmī, *Khāṭirāt*, 86–7.

¹⁰² See ‘Abduh, *Al-A'māl al-kāmila*, vol. I, 327–330; 331–335.

In the above-mentioned Islam and Christianity vis-à-vis science and civilization, he compared the two religions and concluded that Islam is more rational, tolerant and realistic: rational, because its arguments are based on reason and not on miracles; tolerant, because Muslims are reluctant to excommunicate each other and have never sought to impose their religion on others; realistic, because it takes account of the needs of both this world and the next.^{*103} Another of ‘Abduh’s famous polemics was against French Orientalist Gabriel Hanotaux, who had written a series of articles criticizing “Muslim fatalism”. ‘Abduh retorted with the example of the industrious Jews and Phoenicians and with that of Prophet Muḥammad, of whom he asked rhetorically: “Can we say of him that he laid back on his pillow, leaving the task of propagating his message to fate?”^{*104} In addition, he contrasted the irrationality of Christianity to the rationality of Islam and emphasized the role of al-Andalus in western progress.^{*105} Nevertheless, the *Imām* was a great admirer of western civilization, endeavored to learn French when he was already middle-aged and travelled to Europe whenever he had the chance “to renew himself”, as he said.^{*106} One of his famous most quotes reads: “In Europe I found Islam but not Muslims. Here in the East, I find Muslims but not Islam.”^{*107}



ILLUSTRATION – Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s meeting with members of the executive committee of Tunisian educational institute Khaldounia in 1903.

ILUSTRACIJA – Sastanak Muḥammada ‘Abduhua sa članovima izvršnog odbora tuniskog obrazovnog instituta Khaldounia 1903.

¹⁰³ ‘Abduh, *Al-Islām wa al-naṣraniyya*, 296–315.

¹⁰⁴ Muḥammad ‘Abduh, *Al-Radd ‘alā Hanotaux*; in Muḥammad ‘Imāra (ed.), *Al-A’māl al-kāmila li imām Muḥammad ‘Abduh*, vol. III. (Beirut & Cairo: Dār al-shurūq, 1993; 217–256), 226–7.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 232–4, 222.

Elsewhere, ‘Abduh argued that the Renaissance could be traced back to what Europeans had learnt from the Muslims both in Al-Andalus and during the Crusades and, like Al-Afghānī, added that the Protestant Reformation had its origin in Islam; see *Risāla al-tawḥīd*, 455–6, 477–8.

¹⁰⁶ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 135.

¹⁰⁷ ‘Abduh adopted the Koranic concept of “divine custom” (*sunnat allāh*) to designate the universal, immutable rules that govern the destiny of all peoples, not just Muslims. In his opinion, the Islamic world had declined because Muslims abandoned the sound faith and good deeds that God rewards, whereas the Western world had prospered because its people behaved according to God’s will. See *Tafsīr al-Manār*, I: 336, IV: 294; see also ‘Abduh, *Al-Islām wa al-naṣraniyya*, 302–4.

In contrast, Rashīd Riḍā only visited Europe once - to attend the 1921 Syro-Palestinian Congress - did not bother to learn any of its languages and was rather hostile to the west in general. Not that his hostility was unjustified; after all, the Europeans were responsible for the deep rift that had split Muslim societies through their promotion of the westernized elite and, after the First World War, had broken their promises to the Arabs and carved up their lands among themselves. The Shaykh was convinced that they also sought to turn Muslims away from their religion, either by perverting their mores, converting them to Christianity, or both.^{*108} And he had a tendency to concentrate on the most negative aspects of western civilization. For instance, he claimed that it could not be considered Christian, but merely materialistic, and predicted that its vices would lead to its destruction.^{*109} Convinced that Islam provides the solution to all problems plaguing western societies - from materialism to immorality to socialism^{*110} - Riḍā set out to correct the European people's representation of Islam, distorted, he believed, by the Orientalists, the Church and their governments.^{*111} In 1933 he published *Al-Waḥy al-muḥammadī* ("The Revelation of Muḥammad") with the western reader in mind; from the second edition, it included an appendix on the "scientific miracle" of the Qur'an.^{*112}




ILLUSTRATION ~ Riḍā tried to correct the idea of Islam among the European peoples, distorted, as he believed, by the Orientalists, the Church and their governments.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Riḍā je pokušao da ispravi predstavu o islamu kod evropskih naroda, iskrivljenu, kako je vjerovao, od strane orijentalista, Crkve i njihovih vlada.

¹⁰⁸ *Al-Manār*, XI: 110–1; XI: 439–40; XXII; XXIII: 439–40.

¹⁰⁹ *Al-Manār*, XXIV: 257, 268.

¹¹⁰ *Al-Manār*, I: 945–9; XXIV: 193–4, 884–5; XXIX: 67.

¹¹¹ Riḍā, *Al-waḥy al-muḥammadī*, 21–3.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 310–1.

His work: *The Revelation of Muḥammad* was an instant success with the Muslim public, and Urdu and Chinese versions soon appeared. However, in the prologue to its third edition, Riḍā complained that the book still had not been translated into any European language; see Riḍā, *Al-waḥy al-muḥammadī*, 6–7.

The Shaykh did express a grudging admiration towards Europe's progress, but mitigated it by attributing such progress to Muslim influence. He reiterated its role in the development of the west^{*113} - adding that the Europeans had learned the basis of constitutional government from Saladin and that now they had the audacity to tell Muslims that the cause of their backwardness was their religion!^{*114} Conversely, he did not shy from supporting his arguments by quoting (often unnamed) western sources: the English head-teacher who was expelled from an Egyptian school due to a report in which she had recommended the compulsory teaching of Islam to all pupils;^{*115} the German intellectual who argued that westerners should erect statues to Mu'āwiya in their capitals because, had he not deviated from the path of the rightly-guided *caliphs*, Muslims would have conquered the whole of Europe^{*116} the British scholar who affirmed that if one single language were to be chosen for the whole of humanity, that language would have to be Arabic,^{*117} and other similar examples that may provoke the western reader's skepticism but reinforce Muslim feelings of grievance and victimization.



ILLUSTRATION ~ *Shaykh* Rashīd Riḍā expressed grudging admiration for the progress of Europe, but tempered it by attributing such progress to Muslim influence.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Šaykh* Rashīd Riḍā je izrazio nevoljno divljenje prema napretku Evrope, ali ga je ublažio pripisujući takav napredak muslimanskom utjecaju.

¹¹³ *Al-Manār*, I: 733, V: 361; Tafsir *Al-Manār* XI: 247.

¹¹⁴ Riḍā, *Al-waḥy al-muḥammadī*, 239–40.

¹¹⁵ *Al-Manār*, XIV: 224.

¹¹⁶ *Al-Manār*, XXIV: 35–6.

¹¹⁷ *Al-Manār*, 1910: 910.

Conclusion

This article has shown the main lines of thought of the founders of *Salafism*. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī was a revolutionary who saw in Islam elements of unity and mobilization; the *Encyclopédie de l'Islam* describes him as “the father of modern Muslim anticolonialism.”^{*118} Muḥammad ‘Abduh was a pragmatic gradualist who believed in reconciling revelation with reason and for whom religion had an essentially moral function.^{*119} Both tried to prove that, well understood, Islam is not incompatible with modernity, and encouraged Muslims to embrace the latter without abandoning the former. Rashīd Riḍā, however, perceived modernity as a threat and felt that successive concessions to it would lead to the wholesale abandonment of religion. His alternative was an Islam that controls all aspects of individual and social life; this idea, implicit in most of his writings, is made explicit on several occasions:

For Muslims, religion governs everything, and its reform entails the reform of everything.^{*120}

Islam is a religion of faith and worship, knowledge and wisdom, politics and state, and the basis of culture and civilization.)^{*121}

The Koran is the word of God and contains everything human beings need to carry out religious, social, political, financial and military reform.^{*122}

It was probably Riḍā who coined the slogan *Al-Islām dīn wa dawla* (“Islam is religion and state”),^{*123} which would be popularized by Ḥasan al-Banna and the Society of Muslim Brothers. For the Shaykh, rejecting the political dimension of Islam was tantamount to atheism, and the latter inevitably meant depravity and wantonness.^{*124} Even in his youth, he wrote that “[n]o Muslim submits to man-made laws but by force.”^{*125}

¹¹⁸ *EI* 2 vol. II: 427.

¹¹⁹ See Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 145, 161; *EI* 2 vol. VII: 421.

¹²⁰ *Al-Manār*, VIII: 71.

¹²¹ *Al-Manār*, XXXIII: 2.

¹²² Riḍā, *Al-waḥy al-muḥammadī*, 28.

¹²³ *Al-Manār*, XXV: 702; XXVIII: 286; XXXIII: 211.

¹²⁴ *Al-Manār*, XXVII: 120, 127.

¹²⁵ *Al-Manār*, I: 767.

We can find the same idea in Abu al-'Alā al-Mawdūdī's concept of *ḥākimiyyat allah* ("God's sovereignty"), which the Pakistani scholar contrasted to the "impious" legislation produced by parliaments. Mawdūdī's *ḥākimiyya* was adopted by Sayyid Quṭb, who added the idea of "new *jāhiliyya*," i.e., return to the pre-Islamic age of ignorance of God. That would lead to the excommunication of Muslim governments that do not rule according to the *sharī'ah* and, eventually, some radical groups' excommunicating the whole of society for its submission to those "apostate" governments. That concept, introduced into mainstream Islamism by Sayyid Quṭb, would lead to the excommunication of Muslim governments that do not rule according to the *sharī'ah* and, eventually, to some radical groups' excommunicating the whole of society, for its submission to those "apostate" governments. Of course, Riḍā cannot be blamed for the excesses of modern Islamist extremists. Nevertheless, he is at least partly responsible for the direction taken by *Salafism*, which, with the Muslim Brothers, would develop into political Islam.

Riḍā's influence over modern-day Islamists is so entrenched that at times his words are reproduced almost verbatim. Let us take as an example Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwī, an influential Islamic scholar and former Muslim Brother who is often seen as the archetype of the Islamist moderate: As we have seen, Riḍā considered western civilization "fake Christian," because of its rampant materialism.*¹²⁶ al-Qaraḍāwī sees it as "the civilization of the Antichrist" who, according to one *ḥadīth*, is one-eyed, just as the west is "a one-eyed civilization that looks at the person, life and the world with one eye: the materialist, sensorial eye, ignoring the unworldly and the spiritual."*¹²⁷ Riḍā accused secularists of immorality and treason;*¹²⁸ al-Qaraḍāwī portrays them as an elite rejected by the people and wonders "who is behind" them.*¹²⁹ For Riḍā, Christian Ethiopia's independence proved that the western colonial powers targeted Muslim lands;*¹³⁰ for al-Qaraḍāwī, western support for Ethiopia against Eritrea was one of the examples that proved the fallacy of claims that the west is interest-driven, not anti-Islam.*¹³¹ Despite his criticisms of Mu'āwiya, Riḍā idealized the Umayyad and Abbasid *caliphates*;*¹³² al-Qaraḍāwī consecrated his book *Our Calumniated History* to defend them against

¹²⁶ *Al-Manār*, XXIV: 257.

¹²⁷ In *Al-Sharī'a wa al-Ḥayā* (2004) "Al-muslimūn wa al-'unf al-siyāsī 1". *Al-Jazeera* (23-05-2004). Available in: <http://www.aljazeera.net/channel/archive/archive?ArchiveId=92972> [consulted 03/05/2007].

¹²⁸ *Al-Manār*, XXVIII: 127; XXX: 127.

¹²⁹ Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *Thaqāfatun-nā bayna al-iftitāḥ wa-l-inghilāq* (Cairo: Dār al-shurūq, 2000), 64; Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *Tārīkhun-nā al-muftarā 'alay-hi* (Cairo: Dār al-shurūq, 2006), 32.

¹³⁰ *Al-Manār*, XIV: 434.

¹³¹ Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *Al-Ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyya bayna al-jumūd wa al-taṭarruf* (Cairo: Dār al-shurūq, 2001), 93–4.

That work was first published in 1982, and al-Qaraḍāwī is referring to the Eritrean war of independence — in fact, the US supported Eritrea against the communist Ethiopian regime, whilst the latter was backed by Moscow.

¹³² See *Al-Manār*, VIII: 787, XXIV: 774.

their detractors.*¹³³ Both attributed the end of the *caliphate* to a Jewish conspiracy,*¹³⁴ and contrasted the tolerance of the Qur'an with the bloodthirstiness of the Torah,*¹³⁵ and so on.

Unfortunately, there is very little left of the positive aspects of original *Salafism* in mainstream Islamism, let alone modern *Salafism*. Al-Afghānī and 'Abduh's fresh approach to the sources of Islam, their eagerness to question the Islamic heritage, their attempt to reclaim what is best in western civilization, all that is gone, or has become extremely marginal. Riḍā's change of direction was reinforced by the traumatic experience of colonialism and post-colonialism, the military defeats that led to the loss of Palestine and the invasion of other Arab territories, repression in the hands of autocratic regimes that claimed to stand for "foreign" ideologies like socialism or liberalism, a hasty and unequal modernization that has not fulfilled its promises but has led to disenchantment and alienation. All those factors have contributed to the rise of Islamism as an ideology that rejects any values or ideas that come from the west, from secularism to mixed schooling, and pretends to adopt the instruments and techniques of modern science without the cultural context that has made them possible - the so-called "Islamic dream of semi-modernity."*¹³⁶ In this article, we have argued that many of the more self-defeating features of Islamism can be traced back to Rashīd Riḍā. Their continued grip on Islamist discourse shows that Riḍā's attitudes still resonate with the advocates of political Islam.

¹³³ Al-Qaraḍāwī, *Tārīkhu-nā*, 77–123.

al-Qaraḍāwī's arguments speak for themselves. For instance, he argues that the Umayyads' military victories show that God was with them — and would have He supported them had they not been righteous? (2006: 82).

¹³⁴ See *Al-Manār*, XXX: 388, XXXIII: 350; Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī "Filistīn, sinā'a al-mawt". Mudhakkirāt (2001–2). Available in: <http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/personality/2001/12/article6.SHTML> [consulted 24/04/2007]

¹³⁵ *Al-Manār*, XIV: 299–300; Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *Al-Jihād bayna shari'a al-tawrāt wa-shari'a al-qur'ān*. Naḥnu wa al-gharb (15-10-2006). Available in: http://www.alqaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4535&version=1&template_id=256&parent_id=12 [consulted 03/05/2007];

Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (2007), *Al-rifq wa al-'unf wa al-salām wa al-ḥarb fī shari'a al-tawrāt*. Al-bāba wa al-islām (20-03-2007). Available in: http://www.alqaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4914&version=1&template_id=259&parent_id=12 [consulted 22/04/2007];

Al-Qaraḍāwī Net (2002), *Al-radd 'alā al-qiss alladhī hājama Muḥammad ṣallallahu 'alay-hi wa sallam* (12-10-2002). Available in: http://www.alqaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4422&version=1&template_id=104&parent_id=15 [consulted 22/04/2007];

Al-Qaraḍāwī Net (2006), *al-Qaraḍāwī li al-bāba: Hadhā dīnu-nā wa al-naṣārā hum al-asra' li al-sayf* (24-09-2006). Available in: http://www.alqaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4422&version=1&template_id=104&parent_id=15 [consulted 22/04/2007].

In al-Qaraḍāwī's defense, many of these texts defend Islam from those who accuse it of being a violent religion, including pope Benedict XVI. For more on al-Qaraḍāwī's reaction to the latter's infamous Regensburg address, see Ana Belén Soage, *The Muslim reaction to Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg address*, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8(1), 137–143.

¹³⁶ Bassam Tibi, *Islam between Culture and Politics* (London & New York: Palgrave, 2001), 6ff.

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